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My dissertation examines a board’s decision to hire a star CEO and the 
implication of such decision on the new CEO compensation and firm 
performance. I develop a new methodology to identify a star CEO by analyzing 
the texts contained in 18,240 Wall Street Journal news articles. Unlike previous 
measures, my new measure accounts for the time series variations of executives’ 
visibility as well as how favorably these executives are portrayed in the business 
press. In order to study the role of board composition on CEO selection, executive 
compensation and firm performance, I introduce board industry tenure, a new 
measure of board composition, to capture the average years of industry-related 
experience acquired by independent directors. 
In my first essay, I investigate a board's decision to hire a star CEO and 
analyze the consequences of this decision for firm performance. I show that 
boards with short industry tenure or busy boards are more likely to select a star 
CEO. Firms that hire star CEOs subsequently perform worse than firms that hire 
non-star CEOs. However, after I use the propensity score matching method to 
control for pre-hiring board composition and other determinants of star CEO 
selection, firms that hire star CEOs perform equally well as firms that hire non-
star CEOs. 
My second essay compares the compensation design of a star versus a non-
star CEO. I find that a star CEO is awarded 1.87 million dollars more in annual 
total compensation, and 2.19 million dollars more in annual option compensation, 
after I control for firm size, board characteristics, B/M ratio, leverage, 
EBIT/Assets, stock return, firm risk, industry and year effects, and other related 
variables. In addition, star CEOs receive higher compensation in firms where 
directors have short industry tenure, where directors hold multiple board seats 
simultaneously, where board size is large, and where board is composed of less 
independent directors. The above results hold true after I use a control-group 
approach, based on CEO matching to alleviate CEO selection issue. I also show 
that the equity portfolio of star CEOs exhibit higher sensitivities to change in 
stock price than non-star CEOs.  
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Essay 1: Selection of Star CEOs and Firm Performance 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines a board's decision to hire a star CEO and analyzes the 
consequences of this decision for firm performance. We propose a new 
methodology to identify star CEOs by analyzing the texts contained in 18,240 
Wall Street Journal news articles. Unlike previous measures, our new metric 
accounts for the time series variations of executives’ visibility as well as how 
favorably these executives are portrayed in the business press. The proposed 
measure indicates that boards with short industry tenure or busy boards are more 
likely to select a star CEO. Consistent with previous evidence, firms that hire star 
CEOs perform subsequently worse than firms that hire non-star CEOs. However, 
in contrast to previous work, we show that this underperformance is attributable 
to boards with short industry tenure or busy boards, rather than the ineffectiveness 
of star CEOs. Furthermore, our event studies of stock market reactions to hiring 
news imply that investors prefer star CEOs selected by boards with long industry 
tenure. Our work contributes to the literature by offering insights into how board 
composition affects firm performance. 
JEL Classification: D8; G3 





Selecting a new CEO is among the most important decisions made by the 
board of directors. CEO hiring decisions directly affect future firm performance, 
thus having major implications for the value of corporation. This paper examines 
both the impact of board composition on CEO hiring decisions and the operating 
performance under the new CEO. We particularly focus on one special dimension 
of boards’ hiring decisions: Does the board of directors prefer someone already 
known and favored by the business press and shareholders, or someone unknown? 
In this paper, we define the former candidate as a star CEO and investigate star 
versus non-star based hiring decisions. In particular, we examine the factors that 
influence the board of directors to hire a star versus non-star CEO. We then assess 
the implications of such decisions for future firm performance. Finally, we use 
short-term event studies to analyze investor responses to the news of hiring star 
CEOs. 
We propose a new methodology to measure the star status of CEO hires from 
Wall Street Journal (WSJ) news texts. This methodology incorporates both WSJ 
news counts (how often a CEO is mentioned) and tone analysis of these news 
articles. Ultimately, we define a star CEO hire as one who meets two criteria: he 
(she) was cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to 
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succession and these articles did not overall present a negative tone regarding the 
executive.  
Employing this new measure to define star CEOs, we scrutinize the role of 
board composition on boards’ CEO hiring decisions. We introduce board industry 
tenure, a new variable regarding board composition, to capture the average years 
of industry-related experience acquired by independent directors. We discover 
that boards with short industry tenure or busy boards have a higher tendency to 
select a star versus non-star CEO. These variables, board industry tenure and busy 
board, are both statistically and economically significant after controlling for firm 
size, previous firm performance, industry, year, and CEO characteristics. We 
conjecture that boards with short industry tenure or composed of busy directors 
are less able to evaluate CEO candidates’ expertise. Thus, boards with these 
characteristics are prone to make non-optimal CEO hiring decisions. 
We find firms that hire star CEOs subsequently perform worse than firms that 
hire non-star CEOs, consistent with Malmendier and Tate (2009) and Ang and 
Nagel (2008). We derive this result by conducting a difference-in-difference 
analysis on firm operating performance following CEO turnovers. The 
underperformance of star CEO firms is robust to controls for industry, year, firm 
size and firm fixed effects. During the four-year period (-2, +2 year) surrounding 
the hiring event, the change in the EBITDA/Assets ratio is on average 1.96% less 
for a firm managed by a star CEO versus a non-star CEO. Using different time 
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windows such as (-2, +1 year) and (-2, +3 year) around the hiring event leads to 
similar results. 
We further investigate the source of the underperformance, paying special 
attention to the possibility that this underperformance is caused by the selection of 
star CEOs. In particular, it may be the non-optimal CEO hiring decisions of 
boards, rather than the inability of star CEOs, that drives the underperformance. 
Indeed, our paper illustrates that underperformance diminishes after we match the 
sample of star versus non-star CEOs based on pre-hiring board composition and 
other determinants of star CEO selection.  
Finally, we perform short-term event studies to analyze stock price reactions 
to the news of hiring star CEOs.  Employing the traditional market model 
approach, we find firms that hire star CEOs experience a two-day abnormal return 
of 1.14% following the hiring announcement. By contrast, the hiring 
announcement of a non-star CEO produces no significant two-day abnormal 
return. The difference in stock market responses to the news of hiring star versus 
non-star CEOs is 1.14% during the first two days, and 2.36% during the first 
month. More interestingly, within the group of star CEOs, investors respond more 
favorably to those selected by boards with long industry tenure. There exists a 
0.89% difference in the two-day abnormal return between boards with long 
industry tenure and boards with short industry tenure. Overall, our evidence on 
stock market responses shows that, first, our star CEO measure indeed captures 
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star CEOs’ appeal to the investors, and, second,  that investors prefer star CEOs 
selected by boards with more industry experience. 
Our results offer insights into the effectiveness of boards in making CEO 
hiring decisions, particularly those composed of directors who lack industry 
experience or who are busy. Star CEOs appeal to the business press and 
shareholders, even though they may lack the management skills required to 
maximize shareholder wealth. Evaluating their long-term management potential 
against their immediate appeal requires a board that has both the knowledge and 
the correct incentive. We conjecture that a board with less industry experience 
favors a star CEO because the board lacks the knowledge to evaluate the 
management skills of candidates. We also conjecture that a board filled with busy 
directors prefers a star CEO because the board lacks the appropriate incentives to 
carry out the costly evaluation process. Overall, the main results in our paper 
confirm the above conjectures. 
A major challenge in researching star CEO selection is to create an empirical 
measure that not only captures an executive’s appeal to the business press and 
shareholders, but also offers significant cross-sectional and time series variations. 
Previously, Malmendier and Tate (2009) evaluate the performance change of star 
CEOs. In their paper, a CEO gains star status after winning a prestigious award 
from major business magazines. However, their star CEO metric cannot be used 
to measure the star status of a CEO hire who was not previously a CEO. 
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Moreover, their measure cannot fully account for the time series variation of a 
CEO hire’s visibility and how favorably he (she) is portrayed in the business 
press. Unlike Malmendier and Tate (2009), we extract and evaluate rich text 
information regarding the star quality of CEO hires contained in 18,240 WSJ 
articles. Compared with the previous measure, the resulting panel of star CEOs in 
our sample is large and has significant variations, adding to the power of our 
empirical tests on boards’ hiring decisions. 
Our paper provides three major contributions to current research on star CEOs 
and on corporate governance in general. To start with, this is the first paper to 
study boards’ hiring decisions of star CEOs. By doing so, we provide a new angle 
to examine boards’ agency problems that have not been studied in the domain of 
corporate governance and board composition. Previously, researchers find that 
firm value is influenced by board size (Yermack (1996)), independence of board 
members (Dahya et al. (2002), Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), and others), 
and number of board seats held by directors (Core et al. (1999) and Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006)). Furthermore, Malmendier and Tate (2008) and Fernandes and 
Fich (2010) find that financial expertise of directors significantly affects firm 
external funding, firm investment-cash flow sensitivities and bank failure. Our 
research shows that industry experiences of board members play an important role 
in CEO hiring decisions. In particular, boards with short industry tenure 
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negatively affect firm performance by selecting star CEOs who do not possess the 
necessary management skills. 
Second, we add to the understanding of the performance of star CEOs by 
showing that star CEO underperformance is attributable to the non-optimal CEO 
hiring decisions made by boards with short industry tenure or busy boards. In 
their paper “Superstar CEOs,” Malmendier and Tate (2009) examine the time 
series change in firm performance after a CEO gains star status by winning a 
prestigious business awards. Malmendier and Tate find that the frequency of 
obtaining star status is independent of the governance measure of G-Index 
(Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)). In addition, the award-winning CEOs 
subsequently underperform relative to a matched sample of non-winning CEOs. 
Unlike Malmendier and Tate (2009), we look into the cross-sectional difference in 
firm performance managed by a star versus non-star CEO. Our research show that 
a variety of board composition  measures including board industry tenure, busy 
board, board size, and board independence have a direct influence on the 
probability of selecting a star versus non-star CEO.  
Ang and Nagel (2008) provide evidence on the underperformance of outsider 
CEOs with superior past performance or from large firms. Their work is related to 
our performance evaluation of star CEOs because star CEOs are more likely to 
come from larger firms or firms with better past performance. Unlike Ang and 
Nagel (2008), we consider the effect of board composition on CEO selections. 
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Thus, by isolating the real effects of star status on firm performance from the 
effects of board composition, our work is less likely to be biased by the board 
selection issues. 
Our third contribution relates to the development of content analysis 
methodologies for measuring the star quality of CEO hires. Empirical finance 
research is typically based on quantitative information such as stock price or 
accounting ratios. In contrast, content analysis allows researchers to use 
information from business texts such as news stories, IPO prospectuses, and 
earning releases. Recent innovations on text analysis have spurred promising 
research papers in asset pricing, as shown by Antweiler and Frank (2004), Das 
and Chen (2006), Tetlock (2007), Tetlock, Saar-Tsechanksy and Macskassy 
(2008), Li (2006) and Boukus and Rosenberg (2006).  Similar innovations have 
been applied to corporate finance by Hanley and Hoberg (2009), Hoberg and 
Philips (2008), and Loughran and Macdonald (2008) etc. Compared with previous 
research that measures the tone or sentiment of news articles, this paper evaluates 
how favorably human subjects such as company executives are portrayed in news 
articles. This methodology is especially useful for financial research that explores 
the role of executive characteristics or media influence. 
This paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes our main databases, the 
matching method between these datasets, and the key variables. In Section 3, we 
discuss our methodology to identify star CEOs as well as the distribution of star 
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status and star CEO turnovers. In Section 4, we compare firm, board, and personal 
characteristics between star and non-star CEO turnovers. Section 5 analyzes the 
factors that affect star CEO selection. In Section 6, we compare firm operating 
performance after star versus non-star CEO appointments. Section 7 examines 
investor responses to news of hiring star CEOs. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2 Data Sources  
 
To carry out the study on star CEOs, we match data sources from four 
databases: Compustat, BoardEx, Factiva and CRSP. The ExecuComp database of 
Compustat provides information on CEO turnovers such as succession dates, new 
CEOs’ ages, tenures, and other personal characteristics. Employment records and 
other characteristics of company board members are obtained from BoardEx. We 
analyze WSJ news articles from Factiva to identify star CEOs. Finally, firm stock 
return and accounting data come from CRSP and Compustat.  
Table 1 presents definitions and data sources of all the variables used in this 
paper. Below we start with a brief overview on the four databases and then 
explain our matching methodologies among them.  
ExecuComp provides annual snapshots of employment, personal, and 
compensation information on the top five executives of S&P 1500 companies 
since early 1990s. Compared with ExecuComp, BoardEx includes information on 
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both public and private firms, and especially offers comprehensive coverage of 
company board members. It has employment and personal information on over 
10,000 company boards and 180,000 directors and top executives. Factiva offers 
full text access to about 8,000 business sources including national and 
international newspapers, magazines, news wire services, web sites, and industry 
(trade) sources since early 1980s. Compustat and CRSP are two commonly used 
databases on financial reports and stock market information of U.S. public 
companies. 
We begin by identifying CEO turnovers in the ExecuComp database. We 
identify a CEO turnover during the first year of an executive’s tenure as a CEO of 
a specific firm. We then categorize this turnover into either an outside or an inside 
turnover according to the following criterion. An insider CEO is one who had 
already been working for the firm twelve months before the date of succession; on 
the other hand, an outsider CEO is one who joined the firm less than twelve 
months before the date of succession. 
We match ExecuComp and BoardEx to link each CEO turnover with the 
board members who selected the incoming CEO. The two databases have two 
different identification systems for firms, so we used two common data items 
(firm name and firm ticker) to ensure that the data from a firm in ExecuComp is 
correctly linked to the same firm in BoardEx. 
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Finally, we match the information on CEO turnovers from ExecuComp with 
firm accounting and stock return data from Compustat and CRSP. The link of 
GVKEY to PERMNO is used to match data items in the CRSP/COMPUSTAT 
merged database.  Our matching methodologies give us a sample of 3,488 CEO 
turnovers during the period of 1990 to 2008. These turnovers involve 1,940 
distinct firms and 3,338 distinct new CEOs. Nine hundred and sixty (960) of the 
firms have more than one CEO turnover during the sample period. 
 
3 Identifying Star CEOs  
 
3.1 Methodology  
 
In this section, we develop methodologies based on content analysis to extract 
and evaluate information regarding executives’ visibility as well as how favorably 
they are portrayed in WSJ news articles. By definition, star CEOs are those 
known and favored by the business media. Thus, extracting the opinions of the 
business press about CEO hires is a key step for our research.  
 
3.1.1 Previous Measure of Star CEOs 
 
In determining which executives are star CEOs, we consider the methodology 
of Malmendier and Tate (2009). Malmendier and Tate (2009) attempt to assess 
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the change in firm performance after an incumbent CEO becomes a star. They 
define a star CEO as one who receives prestigious awards from major business 
magazines. In particular, star CEOs in their sample won awards such as “Best 
CEO,” “Best Entrepreneur,” “CEO of the Year,” and “Person of the Year” from 
Business week, Financial World, and ten other business magazines. 
There are several issues with the star CEO measure in Malmendier and Tate 
(2009).  
First, this measure cannot be used to evaluate the star status of a CEO hire 
who was not previously a CEO. Rather than focusing on the star status of 
incumbent CEOs, our paper examines the star status of executives before they are 
hired as CEOs. Therefore, we need to create a new measure that applies to 
executives instead of just incumbent CEOs.  
Second, business magazines limit their coverage of awards on CEOs. This 
results in a small sample (just 264 star CEOs), and, further, cannot fully account 
for the time-series variation of CEOs’ visibility as well as how favorably they are 
considered by the business press. Both the small sample size and lack of variation 
decrease the power of empirical tests in their paper.  
Finally, the evaluation criteria of business awards differ greatly among 
magazines. In addition, both the number of awards selected by each magazine and 
the number of magazines covering awards change substantially over the sample 
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period. In summary, the approach of assigning equal weights to different awards 
at different times in their paper brings problems into the star CEO measure.  
 
3.1.2 Development of the New Star CEO Measure 
 
We propose a new methodology that overcomes the above issues. This new 
methodology allows us to explore richer and more consistent data regarding 
executives’ star quality. This dataset includes 18,240 WSJ news articles from 
1985 to 2008. We use WSJ news articles to represent the opinions of business 
press because WSJ is the largest-circulation newspaper in U.S. with around three 
million readers. It is also one of the most recognized business media among 
investors. 
We develop our new econometric methodology based on content analysis. In 
general, content analysis allows finance researchers to retrieve and analyze 
information from business texts such as news stories, IPO prospectuses, and 
earning releases. A handful of recent research papers employ content analysis to 
assess the tone or sentiment of text documents for a variety of research objectives. 
For example, Tetlock (2007) and Davis, and Piger and Sedor (2006) analyzes 
whether the sentiments of WSJ news articles and earnings releases predict stock 
market performance and firm earnings. Hanley and Hoberg (2009) explore 
whether the tone of IPO prospectuses influences IPO underpricing.  
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Unlike the analyses described above, our research uses content analysis to 
assess how favorably human subjects are portrayed in news articles. Our task is 
particularly challenging for the following reasons.  
Non-unique names. People’s names are not unique, therefore it may be 
difficult to locate the news articles associated with a specific executive. As an 
example, Michael Jordan, the CEO of CBS during the 1990s, has the same name 
as the famous basketball player, whose many endorsements of Pepsi, Coke and 
Nike led to frequent mentions in the marketing section of WSJ. To overcome this 
issue, we impose this strict criterion: An article is counted as the media exposure 
of an executive, only if it includes both the name of the executive and the name of 
a former employer. A firm is an employer if the executive works for the firm as a 
regular employee, an executive, or a director of the company board.  
Varying name formats. WSJ uses different name formats to refer to the same 
executive or firm. For example, between 11/2/1987 and 11/2/1992, General 
Motors executive John Smith was cited 11 times as “John Smith”, and 78 times as 
“John F. Smith”. Firm names may vary similarly in WSJ news articles. We 
address this challenge by first summarizing and then accounting for the majority 
of various name formats adopted by WSJ.  
Difficulties in determining how favorably executives are portrayed in 
articles. Even after identifying news articles associated with each executive, it is 
complex to determine the opinions expressed. Tetlock (2007), Davis, Piger and 
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Sedor (2006), and Hanley and Hoberg (2009) count negative words within WSJ 
news articles or IPO prospectus to assess the sentiments of these texts.  
We adjust this approach along two dimensions so we could determine the 
opinions expressed on executives. First, we create a method to determine whether 
an executive is the main subject of a WSJ news article. If so, we apply tone 
analysis. A significant portion of an executive’s media exposure comes from WSJ 
articles in which the executive is mentioned only once or twice. For example, in 
articles on a competitor’s products, remarks from an executive are quoted to 
support the major story line. Counting negative words in these articles will lead to 
a biased evaluation because negative words in these articles are probably not 
related to the executives. In our study, we find that an executive is generally the 
main subject if the name appears at least three times in a WSJ news article. Thus, 
we draw tone inferences on an executive only from news articles that cite the 
name at least three times.  
We also develop a new list of negative words for tone analysis regarding 
executives. Tetlock (2007), Davis, Piger and Sedor (2006), and Hanley and 
Hoberg (2009) use the negative words list of General Inquirer categories from the 
Harvard psychosocial dictionary 1 . However, this negative word list includes 
words that do not have a negative connotation when evaluating executives. For 
example, the Harvard psychosocial dictionary classifies “board”, “deal”, and 
 
1 http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/ inquirer/homecat.htm. 
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“execute” as negative words. On the other hand, the Harvard negative list ignores 
negative words heavily used in WSJ stories such as “underperforming” 
“manipulate” and “write-off”. Our final negative list is composed of 950 words, 
compared to 2,006 words in the Harvard psychosocial dictionary. Table 2 presents 
the top 20 most frequently used negative words in our sample of WSJ news 
articles. This table compares the most frequently used negative words from the 
Harvard words list, versus those from the new negative word list.  
 
3.1.3 Procedures for Identifying Star CEOs 
 
According to our new methodology, a star CEO hire is one who both attracts 
extensive media exposure and who is, overall, not considered negative by the 
media. Our methodology is composed of three steps.  
Our first step is to count the total number of WSJ news articles associated 
with each executive during the five-year time period (-5 year, +0 day) prior to 
CEO succession. An article is counted as media exposure of an executive if it 
includes the name of the executive and one of his (her) past employers. 
 Next, we perform tone analysis on a subset of the above news articles, 
analyzing only those that mention the executive by name at least three times and 
also mention one of the executive’s past employers. We measure the tone of each 
article by calculating the negative ratio, i.e. the number of negative words divided 
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by the total number of words in the article. We then derive the overall tone for an 
executive by calculating the weighted-average of the negative ratios of all his 
(her) news articles. Executives with larger weighted-average negative ratios are 
then excluded so that the remaining sample includes only executives who are not 
negatively portrayed by WSJ. 
 Our final step is to sort the WSJ article hits by each executive for the 
remaining sample. We class an executive as either a star or non-star CEO hire by 
selecting a cutoff percentage of the distribution of WSJ article hits. Star CEO 
hires are the ones who have the most number of articles relative to the remaining 
sample.  
Our initial sample consists of 3,338 new CEOs who were appointed during 
3,488 turnover events. These new CEOs were mentioned in 18,240 WSJ news 
articles during the five years before they were appointed.  
Within this initial sample of 18,240 WSJ articles, 6,250 of them mention 
1,814 executives at least three times and include at least one mention of these 
executives’ past employer. These articles are subjected to tone analysis. After 
tone analysis, we exclude 174 executives from the sample because, on average, 
they incur more than 27 negative words in a 1,000-word WSJ news article. Our 
final sample is composed of 3,314 CEO turnovers. After sorting the WSJ article 
hits of these turnovers, we adopt a 30% cutoff point. Those who are in the top 
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30% in terms of WSJ article hits are star CEOs. The remainder hires are non-star 
CEOs. Our final sample contains 976 Star CEOs and 2,338 non-star CEOs. 
 
3.2 Distribution of CEO Star Status and Star CEO Turnovers 
 
In this section, we describe the distribution of the star status of our sample, as 
well as the frequencies of star CEO turnovers by year and industry. 
Figure 1 illustrate a highly skewed distribution of the star status of our 
turnover sample. The star status of an executive is measured by his (her) number 
of WSJ article hits during the five years prior to the succession date. A relatively 
small number of executives attracted the majority of coverage. In our sample of 
3,314 CEO turnovers, the majority of the CEOs had been quoted in no more than 
two articles, whereas the top 30% of them were cited by 15 articles on average. 
This highly concentrated media exposure of executives is consistent with the 
superstar phenomenon defined by Rosen (1981).   
After examining the continuous distribution of CEO star status, we split our 
turnover sample into two groups: star versus non-star CEO turnovers. We define 
star CEOs as those who rank in the top 30% within the distribution of sample star 
status; this is equivalently to being mentioned in at least four WSJ articles prior to 
succession. We report the frequencies of star CEO appointments by year and 
industry in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively.  
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According to Table 4 and Table 5, the overall CEO turnover frequency is 
12.52% during the sample period 1990 to 2008.  That is, 12 out of every 100 
firms hire a new CEO each year. The 12.52 % turnover frequency in our sample is 
close to the 11.2% frequency level documented by Huson et al. (2001), which 
uses Forbes magazine’s annual compensation survey data from 1971 to 1994. In 
addition, Murphy (1999) reports an overall CEO turnover frequency of 11.85% 
using Forbes magazine’s annual compensation survey data from 1971 to 1992 and 
ExecuComp database from 1993 to 1995. 
Interestingly, the percentage of star CEO turnovers has significantly decreased 
since 2002. This time window (2002-2008) coincides with the period since the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which set enhanced standards on corporate board, was 
enacted. In contrast to the obvious downward trend of star CEOs, the percentage 
of CEO turnovers is not clustered in any sub-period. As shown in Panel B and C 
of Table 4, the frequency of star CEO turnovers averages 33.47% from 1992 to 
2001, and substantially decreases to 21.78% since 2002. Our test of the difference 
between the sample proportions rejects the hypothesis that the frequencies of star 
CEO turnovers between the two sub-periods are equal at the one percent level.  
Table 5 reveals that star CEO turnovers are concentrated in certain industries. 
For example, the transportation equipment sector (SIC 37), which involves a 
3.17% of total sample CEO turnovers, has a star CEO turnover rate of 47.17%. 
Communications (SIC 48), Security and Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges 
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and Services (SIC 62), and Food and Kindred Products (SIC 20) also have a 
greater proportion of star CEOs turnovers than other industries.  
 
4 Comparison of Firm, Board, and CEO Characteristics 
between Star CEOs and Non-star CEOs  
 
We compare the summary statistics between star and non-star CEO turnovers 
in Table 6. We focus on three panels of variables related to our research 
objectives: firm characteristics, board characteristics, and CEO characteristics. To 
avoid the influence of outliers, all data other than log sales and log assets are 
winsorized at the first and 99th percentile based on all observations. We 
implement two-sample t-tests and Brown-Mood tests to examine whether the 
population means and medians are significantly different for the two types of 
CEO successions. 
 
4.1 Firm Characteristics 
 
According to Table 6, larger firms are much more likely to hire star CEOs. 
Within our turnover sample, the median firm has $1.10 billion in annual sales and 
$1.31 billion in assets. In contrast, firms experiencing a star turnover have median 
sales of $ 3.78 billion and assets of $4.32 billion.  Both the t test and 
21
nonparametric median test rejects the hypothesis that non-star hiring firms are the 
same in size as star-hiring firms at the 1% significance level.  
We obtain mixed evidence regarding the difference in firm operating and 
stock market performance before CEO hiring events. On the one hand, firm 
operating performance, as measured respectively by EBITDA/Assets, 
EBIT/Assets and Net Income /Assets, is, on average, 1.10%, 1.24% and 1.02% 
higher before a star turnover than before a non-star CEO turnover. On the other 
hand, after adjusting for industry median value, the above operating performance 
measures show no significant difference. Furthermore, there is no significant 
difference in both unadjusted and industry-adjusted stock market performance 
during the six months before the two types of CEO successions.  
 
4.2 Board Characteristics 
 
Our paper aims to address boards’ hiring decisions of CEOs. Thus, we start 
with an overview of the characteristics of board members that participate in CEO 
hiring events in our sample. Panel B of Table 6 reveals that an average board has 
six independent directors and three executive directors. On average, an 
independent board member holds two additional board seats at other firms 
simultaneously. Until the date of new CEO succession, a typical independent 
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director has accumulated eleven years of industry related experience during his 
(her) documented employment history. 
We use four variables to describe board composition: board size, board 
independence, busy board and board industry tenure. Board size refers to the total 
number of board directors, including both independent and executive directors. 
Board independence is the number of independent board members divided by the 
total number of directors on the board. In this paper, we define busy board as the 
number of total board seats that an average independent board member holds 
simultaneously. We include the above three variables on board composition 
because previous literature shows that board size, board independence, and busy 
board have various implications on corporate governance as well as firm value.  
This paper introduces a new variable on board composition, board industry 
tenure. The new variable measures the average industry-related experience 
accumulated by independent directors. In particular, we review the employment 
history for every independent director (considering employment as a regular 
employee, an executive or a director), deriving total years of experience in the 
same industry as the CEO hiring firm. We use the two-digit SIC code to classify 
industry. For conglomerate firms and firms with multiple business sectors, we 
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include the two-digit SIC codes of all business sectors documented in the 
Compustat Segment data2.
Panel B shows that compared with boards that hire non-star CEOs, boards that 
choose star CEOs are significantly larger and busier, have fewer independent 
directors, and have less industry-related experience. On average, a board that hires 
a star CEO consists of ten directors and seven independent board members, 
whereas a board that hires a non-star CEO consists of nine directors and seven 
independent board members. In addition, a board that hires a star CEO is, on 
average, both busier and has less industry experience than a board that hires a 
non-star CEO. Specifically, every independent director on a board that hires a star 
CEO typically has 1.03 additional board seats and has 1.95 years less industry 
related experience. The above differences in board compositions are all 
significant at the 1% confidence level between the two types of CEO successions. 
 
4.3 CEO Characteristics 
 
Finally, we report descriptive statistics on new CEOs’ age, whether they are 
insider or outsider CEOs, and their years with the firm before succession. 
According to the results in panel C, star CEOs are about one year older than non-
star CEOs. Star CEOs are also more likely to be outsiders. On the other hand, star 
 
2 The main results in this paper remain unchanged if we only include the two-digit SIC code of a 
firm’s main business sector. 
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CEOs who are insiders typically have longer firm tenure than non-star insider 
CEOs. 
 
5 Accessing the Factors Influencing Boards’ Selections of 
Star CEOs  
 
5.1 Multivariate Logistic Regression 
 
In this section, we employ seven logistic regression models to examine 
various factors that may influence a board’s decision to hire a star versus non-star 
CEO. In particular, we investigate the role of board composition in star CEO 
selection after controlling for firm and CEO characteristics.  
The coefficient estimates of the eight logistic models in Table 7 confirm that 
board composition plays a significant role in star CEO successions, even after 
incorporating the effects of year, industry, firm size, previous firm performance 
and CEO characteristics. A larger board is more likely to hire a star CEO, even 
when allowing for the firm size effect, that is, that large firms tend to hire star 
CEOs. Furthermore, there exists a significant negative relationship between board 
independence and star CEO hires after controlling for board size, firm size and 
other factors.  
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In addition to board size and independence, the number of multiple board 
seats held by independent directors influences the selections of star CEOs. 
According to Table 7, the positive relationship between busy board and star CEO 
selections is robust at the 1% significance level to all controls we use. What’s 
more important, our new board composition variable, board industry tenure, is 
negatively related to the probability of choosing a star CEO at the 1% significance 
level in each of the eight model specifications.  
The significant positive coefficient of log sales in all seven models confirms 
that large firms are more likely to select star CEOs. Firms also prefer hiring a star 
CEO from outside the firm. The relationship between CEO age and the chance of 
being hired as a star CEO is generally negative but not significant. 
According to model 4 and model 5, firms tend to hire star CEOs when their 
previous industry-adjusted accounting performance is worse. However, there is no 
significant relationship between firms’ pre-hiring stock market performance and 
the probability of hiring a star CEO. Unlike previous summary statistics analysis, 
we derive the above negative relationship between industry-adjusted accounting 
performance and star CEO successions after controlling for the influence of firm 
size on CEO selections. 
We include year and industry dummies in most of our logit models to account 
for the time trend and industry concentration of star CEOs suggested in Section 3. 
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None of the industry dummies has additional power in explaining star CEO 
succession after we control for firm size, board composition and other factors.  
There is a strong negative relationship between star CEO turnovers and the 
year dummies of 2002 to 2008. The above relationship is present after controlling 
for firm, board and CEO characteristics. In model 6, we introduce a new dummy 
variable named “AfterSoxAct” to account for the influence of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. Our regression result shows that the influence of board industry tenure, busy 
board, and board independence variables on CEO selection is similar before and 
after passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
In sum, our multivariate logistic regressions show that the following factors 
play a significant role in star CEO selections: (1) all four descriptive variables on 
board compositions (board size, board independence, busy board, and board 
industry tenure), (2) firm size, (3) previous firm accounting performance, and (4) 
whether the turnover happens after 2002.  
For future analysis, we adopt model 7 as our base model for explaining the 
probability of selecting a star CEO. In the following section, we examine the 
economic significance of the factors in affecting boards’ CEO hiring decisions. 
 
5.2 Economic Significance of Factors  
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In order to understand the economic significance of the main independent 
variables in the logistic regression, we calculate the change in predicted 
probabilities of selecting a star CEO if we vary the mean of each factor from its 
mean minus 1/2 standard deviation to its mean plus 1/2 standard deviation, 
without changing other factors. Besides change in predicated probabilities, Table 
8 also reports logit regression estimates from our base model, mean, and standard 
deviation of main factors. 
Firm size and whether the incoming CEO comes from outside the firm have a 
large economic impact on the probability of hiring a star CEO. According to 
Table 8, the chances of a star CEO succession increase substantially by 15.71% if 
the log sales of the hiring firm increase one standard deviation.. 
The economic significance of our board composition variables and firm 
previous accounting performance is similar in scale. In particular, for every one 
standard deviation increase in firm prior EBITDA/Asset ratio, board industry 
tenure, and board independence, the predicated probability of hiring a star CEO 
decreases by, respectively, 3.10%, 5.28% and 4.01%.  In addition, if the number 
of multiple seats held by directors increases by one standard deviation, the chance 
of selecting a star CEO increases by 5.80%. 
 
5.3 Robustness Checks  
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Our results on determinants of boards’ hiring decisions of star CEOs are 
robust to the use of alternative proxies for star CEOs as well as for board industry 
tenure. For one, instead of the zero/one dummy variable, we adopt the continuous 
WSJ news hits to proxy for star CEOs, and conduct an OLS regression of this new 
measure on the same set of factors. The coefficient estimates of our main 
variables on board composition, firm size, previous firm accounting performance, 
and outside CEO remain significant.  
Second, we adopt the top 20% cutoff, rather than the 30% cutoff, within the 
distribution of WSJ articles hits to decide the group of star CEOs. Logit 
regressions of this new star CEO measure lead to similar results as those shown in 
Table 7, which use the 30% cutoff. Adopting a 10% cutoff to decide the group of 
star CEOs does not change our main results either.  
Finally, our logistic regression results are robust when using an alternative 
measure of board industry tenure. Our current measure of board industry tenure 
incorporates industry related experience of a board member as a regular employee, 
an executive or a director. For robustness, we adopt a measure of board industry 
tenure that only takes into account the industry experience of a board member as a 
regular employee or an executive. Logistic regression results show that the 




6 Comparison of Firm Operating Performance after Star 
versus Non-star CEO Successions  
 
6.1 Methodology  
 
Who are able to deliver better operating performance after they are hired: star 
CEOs or non-star CEOs? Understanding the operating performance of star CEOs 
not only helps directors make wise CEO hiring decisions, but also assists 
investors in their portfolio choices. Interestingly, both previous studies on CEO 
performance (Malmendier and Tate (2009) and Ang and Nagel (2008)) imply that 
star CEOs underperform. Malmendier and Tate (2009) find that CEOs who 
achieve “superstar” status via prestigious nationwide awards from the business 
press subsequently underperform, in terms of both stock market performance and 
operating performance. Moreover, Ang and Nagel (2008) claim that outsider 
CEOs with superior past performance record or from large companies have worse 
operating performance than matched insider CEOs.  
The key challenge in CEO performance analysis is potential endogeneity 
problems arising from CEO selection biases. In other words, factors such as firm 
size, industry and board composition determine ex ante whether a star CEO is 
hired. These factors can also affect ex post firm performance. Thus, if we simply 
compare the performance of star CEOs against all non-star CEOs, the result we 
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obtain may be driven either by the difference in management abilities between 
star versus non-star CEOs, or by the difference in the selection factors between 
the two groups. Our major task therefore is to filter out the effects of selection 
factors by comparing star CEOs only with similar non-star CEOs in terms of ex 
ante factors. 
In this paper, we apply the propensity score matching method to alleviate 
CEO selection biases in our performance evaluation. In essence, after establishing 
the factors determining boards’ hiring decisions in Section 5, we match every star 
CEO with a non-star CEO who has the most similar distribution of selection 
factors. We then compare the operating performance difference between the star 
CEOs and the matched non-star CEOs.  
Previous studies, including Malmendier and Tate (2009) and Ang and Nagel 
(2008), are not aware of the impact of board composition on the selection of star 
CEOs. Therefore, they do not control for the difference in board composition 
when they derive their performance evaluation. As a result, the underperformance 
of star CEOs in their sample may be attributable to the hiring decisions of “weak” 
boards, rather than the inability of star CEOs. By contrast, our study isolates the 
real effects of star status on firm performance from the effects of board 
composition, resulting in a less biased evaluation of star CEOs. 
We use the accounting measure of EBITDA/Assets to proxy for firm 
operating performance. In order to control for the influence of unobserved factors 
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on firm operating performance, we adopt a difference-in-difference approach. By 
comparing the differences in the change of firm performance around CEO 
turnovers between the star and the non-star groups, the difference-in-difference 
model allows us to control for the time trend common to the two groups as well as 
for the permanent difference between the performances of two groups that are not 
due to CEO succession effects. 
We evaluate the operating performance of star CEOs in the following three 
steps. In Section 6.2, we start with a simple difference-in-difference analysis 
comparable to prior studies. All non-star CEOs, regardless of their board 
composition, are used as a benchmark for evaluating the performance of star 
CEOs. Next, we derive a less biased performance evaluation by combining the 
difference-in-difference analysis with the propensity score matching method. The 
propensity score matching is based on our logistic regression in Section 5. 
Following the propensity score matching methodology, we only compare star 
CEOs with non-star CEOs who have the most similar distributions of selection 
factors.  Finally, we classify our sample of star CEOs into two sub-groups: star 
CEOs hired by boards with short industry tenure and by busy boards. We then 
specifically evaluate the operating performance of star CEOs hired by these two 
types of boards. 
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6.2 Difference-in-Difference Analysis  
 
Figure 2 presents the average EBITDA/ Assets ratio for star and non-star 
CEOs during the period of (-2 year, +2 year) surrounding turnover events. It 
shows that, consistent with previous findings (Parrino (1997)), firm performance 
decreases before a CEO turnover and recovers after the CEO succession. In 
general, firms that hire star CEOs have larger EBITDA/Assets than firms that hire 
non-stars. However, the difference in accounting performance between the two 
groups significantly decreases after CEO turnovers. With the appointment of non-
star CEOs, firms’ average EBITDA/Assets ratio recovers from 11.48 % one year 
before the hiring to 11.49% two years after the hiring. In contrast, for firms that 
hire star CEOs, the average accounting performance keeps decreasing from 
13.12% to 12.21 % during the same time period. 
To assess more directly the role of CEO star status in improving firm 
operating performance, we estimate the following multivariate regression model 
after controlling for potential variables that influence firm operating performance: 
Y = α + β Star+ γ Star*After +λ After + ϕ X + ε (1) 
The dependent variable Y is firm operating performance, measured by 
EBITDA/Assets. Star is a dummy variable that equals one if the new CEO is a 
star CEO. After is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation relates to a 
year after CEO succession. The interaction term between Star and After examines 
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whether firms managed by star CEOs have better subsequent operating 
performance than firms managed by non-star CEOs. X is a set of the following 
control variables:  firm size, industry, year, and firm fixed effects. Previous 
studies, such as Parrino (1996), Malmendier and Tate (2009), and Ang and Nagel 
(2008), also include these variables to evaluate firm operating performance. 
We carry out two difference-in-difference regressions to compare the 
performance of star versus non-star CEOs and report the results in Table 9. 
Specifically, we examine two alternative event windows relative to the year of 
CEO turnover: (-2, +2 year) and (-2, +3 year). In each of the regressions, we use 
the following control variables:  firm size, industry, year, and firm fixed effects. 
Previous studies, such as Parrino (1996), Malmendier and Tate (2009), and Ang 
and Nagel (2008), also include these variables to evaluate firm operating 
performance. 
The negative coefficients of the interaction dummy “Star CEO * After” in all 
specifications confirm the patterns in Figure 2: star CEOs indeed underperform. 
The improvement in EBITDA/Assets over the five-year period (-2 to +2 year) 
surrounding the hiring event is 1.96% lower for star CEOs, after we control for 
industry, year, firm size, previous firm performance and firm fixed effects. Using 
different time windows3 around the hiring events leads to similar results. 
 
3 Results are similar by using (-2 to +1 year), (-3 to +1 year), (-3 to +2 year), (-3 to +3 year), (-1 to 
+1 year), (-1 to +2 year), and (-1 to +3 year) around the hiring events. 
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6.3 Propensity Score Matching Analysis  
 
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we adopt the propensity score 
matching methodology to alleviate CEO selection biases in the previous 
difference-in-difference analyses. We compare the performance within two 
groups: firms that hired a star CEO, and firms that, even though they have a 
similar predicted probability of hiring a star CEO, hired a non-star CEO instead. 
Our final matched sample is composed of 976 distinct star CEO turnovers and 
476 distinct non-star turnovers because we apply the one-to-one propensity score 
matching with replacements.  
Table 10 shows the results of testing the difference in sample mean of board 
characteristics for star versus matched non-star CEOs. In contrast with previous 
summary statistics results, the differences in board composition are no more 
significant between the propensity score matched samples even at the 15% level. 
For the full sample of 2,338 non-star CEO turnovers, the boards, on average, have 
nine directors and seven independent board members. An independent board 
member holds 2.95 board seats simultaneously and has 8.65 years of industry-
related experience. By contrast, for our propensity score matched sample of 976 
non-star CEO turnovers, an average board has ten directors and seven 
independent board members. An independent board member holds 3.75 board 
seats simultaneously and has 7.65 years of industry tenure. The similarity of board 
35
composition between the matched samples helps us isolate the effect of star CEO 
management abilities from the effect of boards’ hiring decisions. 
We then use the matched samples to implement difference -in-difference 
analysis. Table 9 presents the propensity score matching results in Columns 3 and 
4, in parallel to previous difference-in-difference results without matching. We 
find that after accounting for boards’ selection issues, star CEOs do not
underperform. The size of the coefficient estimate for “Star CEO* After” dummy 
drops substantially, from 1.96 % to 0.09%. Moreover, our test result cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimate is equal to zero at the 73% 
significant level. 
 
6.4 Robustness Checks: Control Group Approach 
 
In this section, we employ an alternative approach of difference-in-difference 
analysis than equation (1) to investigate the role of star CEO in firm performance. 
More specifically, we employ the control group approach suggested by Barber 
and Lyon (1996) to redo the analysis in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3.  
In essence of Barber and Lyon (1996), we conduct the control group approach 
as follows. Each star CEO is matched to a group of non-star CEOs who satisfy 
three criteria. First, the previous operating performance (EBITDA/ASSETS) of 
the non-star CEO firms is within +10% of star CEO firm. Second, the size (Book 
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value of assets) of the non-star CEO firm is within +30% of the size of star CEO 
firm. Last, the star and non-star CEO firms have the same first two-digit SIC 
code. I then compare the mean/median change in operating performance related to 
a star versus control group matched non-star CEO. Mean and median tests are 
used to test whether there is significant difference between the changes in 
operating performance for the two groups of CEOs. 
As show in the Panel A of Table 11, during the time window of (-2, +2) year, 
the median EBITDA/Assets drops from 12.83% to 11.57% for firms managed by 
star CEOs, while the median EBITDA/Assets increases from 13.54% to 14.39% 
for firms managed by control group matched non-star CEOs. The difference in 
change of operating performance between the two types of CEOs is 1.45% at the 
5% significance level. 
We then examine whether the difference in operate ring performance persist 
after we use propensity score matching to control for the effects of board 
composition.  Panel B of Table 11 shows that after accounting for the effects of 
board characteristics, the difference in EBITDA/Assets between star and non-star 
CEOs becomes non-significant. The P-value associated with the median test is 
0.75. In sum, our main findings hold true when we use control group approach to 
conduct difference-in-difference analysis. 
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7 Investor Responses to News of Hiring Star CEOs  
 
This section uses the standard market model approach of short-term event 
studies to analyze investor responses to the news of hiring a star CEO. We are 
particularly interested in answering two research questions. First, how do 
investors respond to the news of hiring a star CEO? Second, do investors react 
differently to star CEOs hired by different board types? We investigate the above 
two questions in each of the following two sections. 
 
7.1 Investor Responses to News of Hiring Star CEOs  
 
Following the market model approach, we use one-year stock market return 
data before hiring events to estimate market model coefficients for each firm that 
experienced a star CEO turnover. Our estimation window is (-250, -20 day4)
relative to the CEO succession dates. We then average the daily abnormal returns 
across all event firms, and obtain cumulative abnormal returns by adding together 
the mean abnormal returns across event windows. We calculate the abnormal 
returns associated with the news of hiring non-star CEOs similarly.  
Figure 3 graphs the announcement return patterns of star versus non-star 
CEOs during the event window of (-5, 20 day). We also examine two different 
 
4 In our event study, days refer to trading days. There are about 20 trading days in one month, and 
250 trading days in one year. 
 
38
event windows, (0, 1 day) and (2, 20 day) in panel A of Table 12. We present 
cumulative abnormal returns during each of the two event windows and test the 
difference in announcement returns between the two groups. P-value is calculated 
by using standard errors from sample event firms. 
Our event studies show significant differences in the way investors react to the 
news of a star versus non-star CEO appointment.  Firms that hire a star CEO 
experience significant positive short-term abnormal returns: 1.02% during the first 
two days and 1.56% during the first one month, both at the 1% significance level. 
In contrast, no significant positive abnormal returns are associated with firms 
hiring non-star CEOs, either during the first two days or during the first month 
after the announcement date. In fact, an average firm that hires a non-star CEO 
has negative accumulated abnormal returns of 0.11% during the first two days and 
0.79% during the first month. Our test results in Table 12 confirm that cumulative 
abnormal returns are 1.14% higher during the first two days after the 
announcement of appointing a star versus non-star CEO. This difference expands 
to 2.36% if we examine the first month after the hiring events. Overall, our study 
illustrates that investors have a strongly positive response to the appointment of a 
star CEO. This positive market response indicates that our new measure of star 
CEOs indeed capture their appeal to the shareholders. 
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7.2 Comparison of Investor Responses to News of Hiring Star 
CEOs by Board Types  
 
In Section 6, we show that the “underperformance” of star CEOs is mostly 
attributable to those hired by boards with short industry tenure or busy boards. A 
natural next question is: Do investors react differently when the board hiring the 
star CEO has short industry tenure or is composed of busy directors?  
Figure 4 and Panel B of Table 12 compares the short-term abnormal returns 
associated with star CEOs hired by boards with long industry tenure versus short 
industry tenure during a variety of event windows. Both Figure 4 and Table 12 
show that the positive market reaction to the news of hiring a star CEO is fully 
concentrated in those selected by boards with long industry tenure. The difference 
in cumulative abnormal returns between star CEOs selected by the two board 
types is 0.89% within the first two days and 3.11% within the first month after the 
CEO turnover event. Thus, consistent with our results of performance evaluation, 
investors prefer star CEOs hired by boards with long industry tenure over those 
with short industry tenure. 
We also investigate the differences in investor responses regarding star CEOs 
hired by busy versus non-busy boards. As shown in Figure 5 and Panel C of Table 
12, this board characteristic has no statistically significant impact on investor 
responses to star CEO appointments. During the first two days after the 
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appointments of star CEOs, both types of firms experience significant positive 
abnormal returns: firms with busy boards experience two-day abnormal returns of 
1.27%; firms with non-busy boards experience two-day abnormal returns of 
0.67%. From the second day until the first month after the announcement (during 
the event window of (2, 20day)), the stock market reactions to the two types of 
firms are different: firms with busy boards experience an abnormal return of -
0.28%; firms with non-busy boards experience an abnormal return of 1.54%. The 
differences in both two-day and one-month abnormal return between the two 
types of firms are not significant.  
 
8 Conclusions  
 
Our paper investigates the impact of board composition on a board’s decision 
to hire a star CEO and the effect of such decision on firm operating performance. 
We analyze the text information contained in 18,240 WSJ news articles to 
evaluate a CEO hire’s visibility as well as how favorably he (she) is portrayed in 
the business press.  
Using a star CEO measure that we develop, we obtain three major findings. 
First, board composition plays a significant role in a board’s decision to hire a star 
CEO. In particular, boards with short industry tenure or busy boards are more 
likely to hire a star CEO, even after controlling for firm size, industry, year, 
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previous firm performance and CEO and other board characteristics. The above 
result is robust to alternative proxies for star CEOs and for board industry tenure. 
Second, incorporating the effects of board composition on boards’ hiring 
decisions helps us overturn the previous understanding of star CEO performance. 
We show that the previously discovered “underperformance” of star CEOs is not 
driven by the inabilities of star CEOs, as suggested by previous research. Rather, 
it is attributable to the hiring decisions of boards with short industry tenure or 
busy boards. In particular, when we adopt an evaluation method that accounts for 
the board selection issue, we show that star CEOs, overall, perform as well as 
non-star CEOs. However, star CEOs selected by boards with short industry tenure 
or busy boards are less capable than non-star CEOs. 
Finally, consistent with our performance evaluation, investors favor star CEOs 
selected by boards with long industry tenure than those selected by boards with 
short industry tenure. The difference in abnormal returns associated with the two 
types of boards is 0.89% during the first two days and 3.11% during the first 
month following the hiring event. 
Our paper has important implications for current discussions on board 
composition. Over the last decade, shareholders, policy makers, and finance 
researchers have debated what type of board structure best serves shareholders. 
Finance researchers (Dahya et al. (2002) and Chharochharia and Grinstein (2009)) 
have shown that board independence plays a significant role in improving 
42
corporate governance and increasing firm value. The NYSE Governance Rule 
Proposal approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission in December 
2003, incorporates this perspective and requires the boards of listed firms to have 
a majority of independent directors. However, some scholars (Holmstrom and 
Kaplan (2003)) and practitioners are concerned that this rule will not benefit small 
firms. Other researches (Yermack (1996), Core et al. (1999), and Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006)) argue that firm value is influenced by the number of board 
seats held by directors, in addition to the board size. Even though evidence on this 
issue is mixed, many corporations now restrict the total number of board seats a 
director can hold.  
We contribute to the above debates by exploring the role of industry tenure of 
directors in board effectiveness. Overall, our research suggests that directors with 
long industry tenure help a board to make the right choice for a CEO. By contrast, 
boards without such tenure can damage firm performance by hiring CEOs who do 
not possess the necessary management skills.  
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9 Figures and Tables
Figure 1 Histogram of WSJ Article Hits
The figure shows the histogram of Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article hits related to 3,314 CEO turnovers in our sample. WSJ article hits associated with
each CEO turnover is defined as the number of the WSJ articles that cite the name of both the new CEO and one of his prior employers during the five-year
period before his appointment date. The horizontal axis is the number of WSJ article hits. The vertical axis shows frequency on the left and cumulative




















Figure 2 Comparison of Operating Performance between Star and Non-star CEOs  
The figure compares average EBITDA/Assets of firms that hired star CEOs with average 
EBITDA/Assets of firms that hired non-star CEOs. The figure examines a five-year time window: from 
two years before to two years after the year of CEO turnover. The year of CEO turnover is excluded from 
the analysis. EBITDA/Asset is earnings before iInterest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by 
total assets. The horizontal axis represents the year, as relative to the year of CEO turnover. For example, 
“year 0” refers to the year of CEO turnover, and “year 1” refers to the year immediately after the year of 
CEO turnover. The vertical axis is EBITDA/Assets. Bars with two different colors represent two groups 
of firms: the group of firms that hired star CEOs (color blue) versus the group of firms that hired non-star 
CEOs (color red). A star CEO is one who was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the 
five years prior to succession, but also was not overall considered negative by those articles. There are 
























Figure 3 Investor Responses to News of Hiring Star versus Non-star CEOs 
The figure plots cumulative market-model abnormal return for news of hiring star versus non-star 
CEOs. The event window runs from five trading days before to twenty trading days after the date of 
hiring announcement. The horizontal axis is the trading date, as relative to the date of announcement. The 
vertical axis is the cumulative market-model abnormal return. Cumulative market-model abnormal return 
is calculated by using an estimation window of (-250 trading day, -20 trading day) relative to the 
announcement date. The smooth blue line represents cumulative abnormal returns for news of hiring star 
CEOs, whereas the dotted red line refers to cumulative abnormal returns for news of hiring non-star 
CEOs. A star CEO is one who was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years 
prior to succession, but also was not overall considered negative by those articles. There are 976 star 
















Figure 4 Investors' Response to News of Hiring Star CEOs by Board Industry 
Tenure 
The figure compares cumulative market-model abnormal return for news of hiring star CEOs by 
boards with long industry tenure versus by boards with short industry tenure. The event window runs 
from five trading days before to twenty trading days after the date of hiring announcement. The 
horizontal axis is the trading date, as relative to the date of announcement. The vertical axis is the 
cumulative market-model abnormal return. Cumulative market-model abnormal return is calculated by 
using an estimation window of (-250 trading day, -20 trading day) relative to the announcement date. The 
smooth blue line represents cumulative abnormal returns for news of hiring star CEOs by boards with 
long industry tenure, whereas the dotted red line refers to cumulative abnormal returns for news of hiring 
star CEOs by boars with short industry tenure. A star CEO is one who was not only cited by at least four 
WSJ news articles over the five years prior to succession, but also was not overall considered negative by 
those articles. There are 976 star CEOs and 2,338 non-star CEOs in our sample. Boards with long 






















Figure 5 Investors' Response to News of Hiring Star CEOs by Busy Board 
The figure compares cumulative market-model abnormal return for news of hiring star CEOs by busy 
versus non-busy boards. The event window runs from five trading days before to twenty trading days 
after the date of hiring announcement. The horizontal axis is the trading date, as relative to the date of 
announcement. The vertical axis is the cumulative market-model abnormal return. Cumulative market-
model abnormal return is calculated by using an estimation window of (-250 trading day, -20 trading day) 
relative to the announcement date. The smooth blue line represents cumulative abnormal returns for news 
of hiring star CEOs by non-busy boards, whereas the dotted red line refers to cumulative abnormal 
returns for news of hiring star CEOs by busy boards. A star CEO is one who was not only cited by at least 
four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to succession, but also was not overall considered 
negative by those articles. There are 976 star CEOs and 2,338 non-star CEOs in our sample. Busy boards 



















Table 1 Variable Definition
Data Item Definition Sources
Assets Total Assets COMPUSTAT, Fundamentals Annual, AT
Sales Net sales COMPUSTAT, Fundamentals Annual,SALE
EBIT / Assets (Operating Income After Depreciation) / (Total Assets) COMPUSTAT, Fundamentals Annual,OIADP / AT
EBITDA / Assets (Operating Income Before Depreciation) / (Total Assets) COMPUSTAT, Fundamentals Annual,OIBDP / AT
Net Income / Assets (Net Income) / (Total Assets) COMPUSTAT, Fundamentals Annual,NI / AT
Industry-adjusted EBIT / Assets (or
EBITDA /Assets)
The difference between a firm’s EBIT / Assets (or EBITDA / Assets)
and the median value of all firms with the same two-digit SIC code COMPUSTAT, Fundamentals Annual
Age Age of the CEO at the time of succession COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp
Outside CEO
Dummy variable: it equals 1 if the incoming CEO is an outside CEO.
An incoming CEO is defined as an outside CEO if he joined the
hiring firm less than twelve months before the date of succession.
COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp
COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp,Years with the firm when
appointed CEO
Time difference between the date of CEO succession and the date
when the CEO joined the firm BecameCeo – JoinDate (or RejoinDate)
Six-month Stock Return Six-month holding period stock return until the date of CEOsuccession CRSP, Monthly Stock
Industry-adjusted Six-month Stock
Return
The difference between a firm’s six-month stock return and the equal-
weighted six month stock return of all CRSP firms with the same
two-digit SIC code.
CRSP, Monthly Stock
Firm Size or Log Sales Firm size, measured by Log(Sales) COMPUSTAT, Fundamentals Annual,Log(SALE)
After
Dummy variable: it equals one for years after CEO turnover and zero
for years before CEO turnover.
After SOX Act
Dummy variable: it equals 1 for years before the passage of
Sarabanes-Oxley Act (July 2002), and zero for years after the passage
of Sarabanes-Oxley Act.
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Year Effect A group of dummy variables, each of which represents a yearbetween 1990 and 2008
Star CEO * After
An interaction dummy variable of “Star CEO” and “After”. It equals
1 only if the firm hired a star CEO and the observation refers to a year
after the CEO turnover.
Industry Effect A group of dummy variables, each of which represents an industry bytwo-digit SIC code
COMPUSTAT, Fundamentals Annual,
SIC
Board Size Total number of directors BoardEx
Board Industry Tenure Average years of experiences independent directors acquired fromfirms of the same industry as the CEO turnover company. BoardEx
Busy Board Average number of board seats simultaneously held by independentdirectors. BoardEx
Board Independence Ratio (The number of independent directors) / (The total number ofdirectors) BoardEx
CAR Cumulated market-model abnormal stock return within a holdingperiod CRSP, Daily Stock
Star CEO
Dummy variable: it equals one if the new CEO was not only cited by
at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to succession,
but also was not overall considered negative by those articles.
Factiva
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Table 2 Most Frequently Used Negative Words for Tone Analysis 
This table presents the top 20 most frequently used negative words in our sample of 18,240 WSJ 
articles related to 3,488 CEOs. Frequency rank is the rank by the frequency of negative words. Negative 
words come from two word lists: Harvard negative word list from the General Inquirer of the Psychology 
Department of Harvard University, and the new negative word list created in this paper. The Harvard 
negative word list includes 2,006 negative words, whereas the new negative word list consists of 950 
words. 
Frequency Rank Harvard Negative Word List New Negative Word List 
1 execute decline 
2 board cut 
3 deal loss 
4 service problem 
5 make concern 
6 close rival 
7 vice challenge 
8 cost criticize 
9 decline fall 
10 run struggle 
11 help lost 
12 cut competition 
13 retire competitor 
14 need drop 
15 charge low 
16 loss battle 
17 outside difficult 
18 problem trouble 
19 resign fail 
20 turn hard 
51
Table 3 Distribution of WSJ Article Hits 
The table shows the distribution of the WSJ article hits of 3,314 CEO turnovers. WSJ article hits 
associated with each CEO turnover is defined as the number of WSJ articles that cite the name of both the 
new CEO and one of his prior employers during the five-year period before the appointment date.  
 
WSJ Hits Frequency  Cumulative Percentage 
0 982 29.63% 
1 650 49.25% 
2 419 61.89% 
3 287 70.55% 
4 200 76.58% 
6 211 82.95% 
8 130 86.87% 
10 94 89.71% 
15 106 92.91% 
20 69 94.99% 
30 61 96.83% 
40 38 97.98% 
60 38 99.12% 
80 11 99.46% 
100 2 99.52% 
200 13 99.91% 
More 3 100.00% 
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Table 4 Star CEO Turnovers by Year 
The table is based on 3,314 CEO turnovers from ExecuComp dataset between 1990 and 2008. Number 
of Firms is the number of distinct firms within a particular year. Percent of CEO turnover is computed as 
the number of CEO turnovers divided by the number of firms in each year. Percent of star CEO turnovers is 
computed as the number of star CEO turnovers divided by the number of CEO turnovers in each year. A 
star CEO is one who was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to 
succession, but also was not overall considered negative by those articles. There are 976 star CEOs and 
2,338 non-star CEOs in our sample. Panel A contains numbers calculated by year. Panel B compares results 
between two sub-periods: before and after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. 
 













1 2 3 = 2 / 1 4 5 = 4 / 2
Panel A: Number of Observations by Year 
1990 - 78 - 39 50.00% 
1991 - 96 - 32 33.33% 
1992 445  97 21.80% 37 38.14% 
1993 1,162  132 11.36% 49 37.12% 
1994 1,551  168 10.83% 54 32.14% 
1995 1,600  189 11.81% 71 37.57% 
1996 1,651  170 10.30% 60 35.29% 
1997 1,675  189 11.28% 68 35.98% 
1998 1,732  204 11.78% 72 35.29% 
1999 1,812  249 13.74% 77 30.92% 
2000 1,792  270 15.07% 80 29.63% 
2001 1,673  223 13.33% 65 29.15% 
2002 1,675  180 10.75% 43 23.89% 
2003 1,743  209 11.99% 42 20.10% 
2004 1,753  194 11.07% 42 21.65% 
2005 1,753  241 13.75% 55 22.82% 
2006 1,819  218 11.98% 47 21.56% 
2007 1,782  173 9.71% 33 19.08% 
2008 851  34 4.00% 10 29.41% 
Sum 26,469  3,314 12.52% 976 29.45% 
Panel B: Number of Observations by Two Sub-periods 
1992-2001 15,093  1,891 12.53% 633 33.47% 
2002-2008 11,376  1,249 10.98% 272 21.78% 
P-values for  tests that the proportions of Star CEO turnovers are equal in the two sub-periods 
0.19   0.00 
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Table 5 Star CEO Turnovers by Industry 
The table is based on 3,314 CEO turnovers from ExecuComp dataset between 1990 and 2008. Number of 
Firm-Years is obtained by adding the number of distinct firms over the entire sample period. Percent of CEO 
turnover is computed as the number of CEO turnovers divided by the number of Firm-Years in each industry 
represented by two-digit SIC code. Percent of star CEO turnovers is computed as the number of star CEO 
turnovers divided by the total number of CEO turnovers in each industry. A star CEO is one who was not only 
cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to succession, but also not overall considered 
negative by those articles. There are 976 star CEOs and 2,338 non-star CEOs in our sample. 
 
SIC 











of Star  
CEO 
Turnovers 
Percent of  
Star CEO 
Turnovers 
1 2 3 = 2 / 1 4 5 = 4 / 2
1 Agricultural Production - Crops 68 8 11.76% 3 37.50% 
7 Agricultural Service 14 4 28.57% 2 50.00% 
10 Metal mining 167 18 10.78% 3 16.67% 
12 Coal Mining 29 2 6.90% 0 0.00% 
13 Oil and gas extraction 784 86 10.97% 16 18.60% 
14 
Mining and Quarrying Of 
Nonmetallic Minerals, Except 
Fuels  
57 6 10.53% 0 0.00% 
15 Building Construction - General Contractors and Operative Builders 169 11 6.51% 1 9.09% 
16 Heavy Construction Other Than Building Construction Contractors  100 16 16.00% 6 37.50% 
17 Construction - Special Trade Contractors 24 2 8.33% 0 0.00% 
20 Food and Kindred Products 677 87 12.85% 46 52.87% 
21 Tobacco Products  46 6 13.04% 2 33.33% 
22 Textile Mill Products  177 14 7.91% 2 14.29% 
23 
Apparel and Other Finished 
Products Made From Fabrics and 
Similar Materials  
244 23 9.43% 10 43.48% 
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 175 18 10.29% 3 16.67% 
25 Furniture and Fixtures  171 21 12.28% 4 19.05% 
26 Paper and Allied Products  437 56 12.81% 15 26.79% 
27 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries  485 59 12.16% 25 42.37% 
28 Chemical and allied products 1,891 235 12.43% 70 29.79% 
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries  253 33 13.04% 15 45.45% 
30 Rubber an dmiscellaneous plastic products 231 28 12.12% 13 46.43% 
31 Leather and Leather Products 91 10 10.99% 2 20.00% 
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32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products  133 14 10.53% 3 21.43% 
33 Primary metal industries 529 74 13.99% 22 29.73% 
34 
Fabricated Metal Products, Except 
Machinery and Transportation 
Equipment  
377 55 14.59% 9 16.36% 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 1,551 242 15.60% 71 29.34% 
36 Electronic and other electrical equipment 1,854 245 13.21% 55 22.45% 
37 Transportation Equipment  770 106 13.77% 50 47.17% 
38 Measuring, Analysing, Controlling Instruments and Related Products 1,239 169 13.64% 32 18.93% 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries  210 34 16.19% 11 32.35% 
40 Railroad Transportation  104 12 11.54% 9 75.00% 
41 
Local and Suburban Transit and 
Interurban Highway Passenger 
Transportation  
23 4 17.39% 0 0.00% 
42 Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing  190 15 7.89% 3 20.00% 
44 Water Transportation  94 8 8.51% 1 12.50% 
45 Air Transportation 226 33 14.60% 16 48.48% 
47 Transportation Services  93 6 6.45% 1 16.67% 
48 Communications 615 74 12.03% 45 60.81% 
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 1,730 234 13.53% 62 26.50% 
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods  527 66 12.52% 12 18.18% 
51 Wholesale Trade - Non-durable Goods  275 44 16.00% 9 20.45% 
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Building Materials, Hardware, 
Garden Supply, and Mobile Home 
Dealers  
94 12 12.77% 5 41.67% 
53 General Merchandise Stores  328 30 9.15% 10 33.33% 
54 Food Stores  170 17 10.00% 7 41.18% 
55 Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service Stations  125 16 12.80% 2 12.50% 
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 420 63 15.00% 15 23.81% 
57 Home Furniture, Furnishings and Equipment Stores  169 28 16.57% 10 35.71% 
58 Eating and Drinking Places  498 49 9.84% 14 28.57% 
59 Miscellaneous Retail  455 59 12.97% 21 35.59% 
60 Depository Institutions 1,532 154 10.05% 47 30.52% 
61 Nondepository Credit Institutions 219 22 10.05% 9 40.91% 
62 Security and Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges and Services 385 44 11.43% 22 50.00% 
63 Insurance Carriers 1,030 89 8.64% 28 31.46% 
64 Insurance Agents, Brokers and Service 137 14 10.22% 3 21.43% 
65 Real Estate 9 2 22.22% 1 50.00% 
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67 Holding and Other Investment Offices 382 11 2.88% 5 45.45% 
70 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps and Other Lodging Places  62 7 11.29% 5 71.43% 
72 Personal Services  123 26 21.14% 3 11.54% 
73 Business Services 2,190 338 15.43% 81 23.96% 
75 Automotive Repair, Services and Parking  59 8 13.56% 4 50.00% 
78 Motion Pictures  74 2 2.70% 2 100.00% 
79 Amusement and Recreation Services  189 26 13.76% 8 30.77% 
80 Health Services 451 57 12.64% 10 17.54% 
82 Educational Services  82 12 14.63% 1 8.33% 
83 Social Services 14 2 14.29% 0 0.00% 
87 
Engineering, Accounting, 
Research, Management, and 
Related Services  
313 41 13.10% 11 26.83% 
99 Non-classifiable Establishments  129 7 5.43% 3 42.86% 
Sum  26,469 3,314 12.52% 976 29.45% 
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Table 6 Firm, Board and CEO Characteristics by Type of CEO Turnover
The table is based on CEO turnovers from ExecuComp dataset between 1990 and 2008. CEO successions are classified into two groups: star CEO turnover and
non-star CEO turnover. A star CEO turnover is one whose new CEO was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to succession,
but also not overall considered negative by those articles. There are 976 star CEOs and 2,338 non-star CEOs in our sample. All the descriptive statistics are
based on winsorized data except Log Sales and Log Assets. All observations are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles, based on all firm-year observations.
Accounting variables are measured in the fiscal year prior to succession. Industry-adjusted accounting numbers are obtained by subtracting the median value of
firms with the same two-digit SIC code. Stock performance variables refer to the six months stock return prior to succession. Board Size refers to the total
number of board directors. Board Independence is measured by the number of independent board members divided by total number of directors. Busy Board is
the number of total board seats that an average independent board member holds simultaneously. Board Industry Tenure is the average years of experiences
independent directors acquired from firms of the same industry as the CEO turnover company. Age refers to the age of the incoming CEO at the time of
succession. Outsider CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the incoming CEO joined the firm less than twelve months before the date of succession. Years
with the Firm When Appointed CEO refers to the time difference between the date of CEO succession and the date when the CEO joined the firm. P-values of two-
tailed t tests and Brown –Mood tests for testing differences in population means and medians are reported after the difference in mean and median values. a, b,
and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Obs Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
1. Firm Size
Assets (million dollar) 3,314 7,519 1,305 976 16,817 4,317 2,338 3,637 816 13,179 a 3,501 a 0.00 0.00
Log Assets 3,314 7.26 7.17 976 8.40 8.37 2,338 6.78 6.70 1.62 a 1.67 a 0.00 0.00
Sales (million dollar) 3,314 4,120 1,101 976 8,645 3,778 2,338 2,231 729 6,414 a 3,048 a 0.00 0.00
Log Sales 3,314 7.02 7.00 976 8.13 8.24 2,338 6.56 6.59 1.57 a 1.64 a 0.00 0.00
2. Accounting Performance
EBITDA / Assets 3,314 11.07% 11.61% 976 11.85% 11.47% 2,338 10.75% 11.66% 1.10% b -0.19% 0.02 0.54
EBIT / Assets 3,314 6.54% 7.44% 976 7.42% 7.23% 2,338 6.18% 7.53% 1.24% a -0.29% 0.01 0.52
Net Income / Assets 3,314 -0.01% 3.13% 976 0.71% 2.77% 2,338 -0.31% 3.29% 1.02% c -0.52% 0.10 0.12
Industry-Adjusted EBITDA /
Assets 3,314 3.93% 2.38% 976 4.04% 2.08% 2,338 3.88% 2.53% 0.16% -0.44% 0.73 0.25
Industry-Adjusted EBIT / Assets 3,314 3.44% 2.10% 976 3.65% 1.74% 2,338 3.35% 2.27% 0.30% -0.52% 0.54 0.24
3. Stock Performance
Six-Month Return 3,314 1.96% -0.96% 976 -0.45% -0.51% 2,338 2.96% -1.27% -3.41% 0.76% 0.13 0.96
Industry-Adjusted Six Month
Return 3,314 -2.53% -2.76% 976 -2.80% -2.38% 2,338 -2.41% -3.01% -0.39% 0.63% 0.73 0.57
Panel B: Board Characteristics
Board Size 3,314 8.99 9 976 10.12 10 2,338 8.52 8 1.60 a 2.00 a 0.00 0.00
Board Independence 3,314 0.74 0.75 976 0.68 0.69 2,338 0.77 0.76 0.09 a 0.07 a 0.00 0.00
Busy Board 3,314 3.21 3 976 3.93 4.05 2,338 2.90 2.93 1.03 a 1.12 a 0.00 0.00
Board Industry Tenure 3,314 11.01 9.87 976 9.64 8.49 2,338 11.59 10.20 -1.95 a -1.71 a 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Incoming CEO Characteristics
Age 3,314 52.06 52 976 52.68 53 2,338 51.80 52 0.87 a 1.00 a 0.00 0.00
Years with the Firm When
Appointed CEO 1,643 2.94 8 514 8.99 3.34 1,129 7.75 2.28 1.05
a 1.24 a 0.00 0.00
Outsider CEO 3,314 0.26 0 976 0.32 0 2,338 0.23 0 0.09 a 0.00 a 0.00 0.00
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Table 7 Determinants of Star CEO Succession 
Coefficient estimates for logistic models are estimated using data of 3,314 CEO turnovers from 
ExecuComp dataset between 1990 and 2008. The dependent variable star CEO is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the incoming CEO was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years 
prior to succession, but also was not overall considered negative by those articles. There are 976 star 
CEOs and 2,338 non-star CEOs in our sample. Unadjusted and industry-adjusted EBITDA/Assets are the 
unadjusted and industry adjusted ratio of EBITDA/Assets of the fiscal year prior to CEO succession.  
Unadjusted and industry-adjusted Six Month Stock Return refers to the unadjusted and industry-adjusted 
six-month holding period stock return prior to CEO succession. Log sales is the log of net sales in the 
fiscal year prior to succession. Board Size refers to the total number of board directors. Board 
Independence is measured by the number of independent board members divided by total number of 
directors.  Busy Board is the number of total board seats that an average independent board member holds 
simultaneously. Board Industry Tenure is the average years of experiences independent directors acquired 
from firms of the same industry as the CEO turnover company. Age refers to the age of the incoming 
CEO at the time of succession. After SOX Act is a dummy variable that equals 1 during year 2002 to 2008 
and zero during year 1990 to 2001. Year Effect is a group of dummy variables, each of which represents a 
year between 1990 and 2008. Industry Effect is a group of dummy variables, each of which represents an 
industry by two-digit SIC code. P-values for two-tailed tests that the coefficient estimates equal zero are 




Dependent Variable: Star CEO 
Model No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Intercept -7.4005 a -7.5149 a -7.1759 a -6.9323 a -5.4484 a -6.3375 a -7.2092 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Board Industry Tenure -0.0267 b -0.0314 a -0.0359 a -0.0355 a -0.0412 a -0.0403 a -0.0358 a
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Busy Board 0.1530 a 0.1558 a 0.1382 a 0.1817 a 0.1596 a 0.1367 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Board Size 0.0279 b 0.0348 b 0.0317 b -0.0072 0.0353 b
0.05 0.02 0.01 0.58 0.02 
Board Independence -0.4511 -0.5504 c -0.7904 a -0.8284 a -0.5524 c
0.13 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.07 
Firm Size (Log Sales) 0.8561 a 0.8202 a 0.7897 a 0.8208 a 0.6901 a 0.8113 a 0.8163 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Un-adjusted EBITDA / 
Assets -2.0376 
a -1.5265 a -2.0179 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 




Un-adjusted Six Month 
Stock Return 0.0076 
0.96 
Adjusted Six Month 
Stock Return 0.0227 
0.89 
Incoming CEO Age -0.0062 -0.0067 
0.36 0.30 
After SOX Act -0.9273 a
0.00 
Industry Effect X X X X X X
Year Effect X X X X X X
Num of Obs. 3,314 3,314 3,314 3,314 3,314 3,314 3,314 
Log-likelihood -1,509 -1,500 -1,497 -1,488 -1,577 -1,520 -1,488 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.2459 0.2502 0.2518 0.2564 0.2149 0.2404 0.2562 
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Table 8 Economic Significance: Changes in Predicted Probability of 
Star CEO Turnovers 
This table illustrates the economic significance of the determinants of star CEO succession using the 
coefficients estimates of logit model 7 in table 7. Logit Regression Coefficient is the coefficient estimate 
of logit model 7 in table 7. Change in predicted probability refers to the change in the predicted 
probability if we vary the mean of one variable from its mean minus ½ to its mean plus ½ standard 
deviation, while keeping the level of other factors in the logit regression unchanged. Board Size refers to 
the total number of board directors. Board Independence is measured by the number of independent board 
members divided by total number of directors.  Busy Board is the number of total board seats that an 
average independent board member holds simultaneously. Board Industry Tenure is the average years of 
experiences independent directors acquired from firms of the same industry as the CEO turnover 
company. Firm size is the log of net sales. P-values of two-tailed t tests for testing differences in 
population means are reported after the difference in mean. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 









Board Industry Tenure -0.04 8.29 5.93 -5.28% 
Busy Board 0.14 3.21 1.36 5.80% 
Board Size 0.04 8.99 4.65 3.58% 
Board Independence -0.55 0.76 0.16 -4.01% 
Firm Size  0.82 7.26 1.22 15.71% 
EBITDA / Assets -2.02 6.54% 12.47% -3.10% 
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Table 9 Difference-in-Difference Analysis of the Performance of 
Star versus Non-star CEOs 
This table assesses the operating performance of star versus non-star CEOs. Column 1 and 2 presents 
the results of a simple difference-in-difference analysis. The results in column 3 and 4 are obtained by 
combining difference-in-difference analysis with propensity score matching. Propensity score matching is 
obtained by applying one-to-one matching method with replacement according to logit model 7 in table 7. 
We obtain the data on CEO turnovers from ExecuComp dataset between 1990 and 2008. We examine 
two event windows: (-2 year, +2 year) and (-2 year, +3 year). In both cases the year of CEO turnover is 
excluded. The dependent variable is EBITDA / Assets.  Star CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the new CEO was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to succession, 
but also was not overall considered negative by those articles. There are totally 976 star CEOs and 2,338 
non-star CEOs in our sample. After is a dummy variable that equals one for years after CEO turnover and 
zero for years before CEO turnover. Star CEO * After is an interaction dummy variable of Star CEO and 
After: it equals 1 only if the firm hired a star CEO and the EBITDA / Assets refers to a year after the 
CEO turnover, and zero otherwise. Firm size is log of net sales. Outsider CEO is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the incoming CEO joined the firm less than twelve months before the date of succession. Firm 
Fixed Effect is a group of dummy variables, each of which represents a firm with a unique GVKEY. Year 
Effect is a group of dummy variables, each of which represents a year between 1990 and 2008. Industry 
Effect is a group of dummy variables, each of which represents an industry by two-digit SIC code. P-
values for two-tailed tests that the coefficient estimates equal zero are listed under the coefficient 
estimates. P-value for the goodness of fit test is presented in the row of Goodness of Fit. a, b, and c 




Without Matching After Propensity Score Matching 
Model No. 1 2 3 4
Event Window [-2 To +2] [-2 To +3] [-2 To +2] [-2 To +3] 
Intercept -0.0952 a 0.0291 b 0.0575 b 0.0965 a
0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Star CEO 0.0041 0.0040 -0.0006 -0.0026 
0.14 0.13 0.87 0.45 
After 0.0084 a 0.0087 a -0.0021 -0.0031 
0.00 0.00 0.38 0.17 
Star CEO * After -0.0196 b -0.0153b -0.0009 0.0006 
0.02 0.03 0.73 0.81 
Firm Size  0.0232 a 0.0177 a 0.0053 c 0.0010 
0.00 0.00 0.07 0.71 
Firm Fixed Effect X X X X
Year Effect X X X X
Industry Effects X X X X
Number of Obs. 12,561 15,087 5,676 5,676 
Goodness of Fit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-Squared 0.1124 0.1055 0.1217 0.1101 
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Table 10 Comparison of the Mean of Board Characteristics  
by Matched Star versus Non-star CEOs 
This table tests the mean difference of board characteristics between our star CEO sample and propensity 
score matched non-star CEO sample. We obtain the data on CEO turnovers from ExecuComp dataset 
between 1990 and 2008. Star CEO succession is one whose incoming CEO was not only cited by at least 
four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to succession, but also was not overall considered 
negative by those articles. There are 976 star CEOs in our sample. Matched Non-star CEO sample is 
obtained by applying one-to-one propensity score matching method with replacement according to logit 
model 8 in table 7. There are 976 non-star turnovers and among them 490 distinct non-star turnovers in 
our final sample of propensity score matched non-star CEOs. Board Size refers to the total number of 
board directors. Board Independence is measured by the number of independent board members divided 
by total number of directors.  Busy Board is the number of total board seats that an average independent 
board member holds simultaneously. Board Industry Tenure is the average years of experiences 
independent directors acquired from firms of the same industry as the CEO turnover company. Difference 
is calculated by subtracting the mean of Matched NO-star CEOs from the mean of Star CEOs. P-values of 
two-tailed t tests for testing differences in population means are reported after the difference in mean. a, 
b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Determinants of Star CEO 
Succession Star CEOs 
Matched Non-
star CEOs Difference P-Value 
Board Industry Tenure 7.43 7.65 -0.22 0.46 
Busy Board 3.93 3.75 0.12 0.25 
Board Size 10.12 9.63 0.49 0.24 
Board Independence 0.70 0.71 -0.01 0.19 
Num of Obs. 976 976 - - 
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Table 11 Difference-in-Difference Analysis of the Performance of 
Star versus Non-star CEOs Using Control-group Approach 
This table employs the control group approach of Barber and Lyon (1996) to assess the operating 
performance of star versus non-star CEO. Panel A compares the change in operating performance 
between star CEOs and control-group matched non-star CEOs. Control group matching is based on 
previous performance, firm size, and industry. Panel B compares the change in operating performance 
between star CEOs and propensity score matched non-star CEOs. Propensity score matching is obtained 
by applying one-to-one matching method with replacement according to logit model 7 in table 7. We 
obtain the data on CEO turnovers from ExecuComp dataset between 1990 and 2008. We examine the 
event windows of (-2 year, +2 year), and the year of CEO turnover is excluded. In both panels, the table 
reports the difference in operating performance (EBITDA/Assets) before (two-year-average) and after 
(two-year average) successions, and differences in these measures around CEO turnovers. Star CEO is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the new CEO was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles 
over the five years prior to succession, but also was not overall considered negative by those articles. 
There are totally 976 star CEOs and 2,338 non-star CEOs in our sample. P-values associated with two 
sample t-test and median test are reported after the differences in operating performance between star and 
non-star CEOs. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Panel A: EBITDA/Assets, Control Group (-2 to +2 Year) 
Star CEO Matched Nonstar CEO Difference P-Value 
Before 
Mean 13.66% 14.00% -0.34% 0.39 
Median 12.83% 13.54% -0.72% 0.17 
Obs. 976 976 
After 
Mean 12.20% 14.07% -1.87% b 0.02 
Median 11.57% 14.39% -2.82% a 0.01 
Obs. 976 976 
Difference 
Mean -1.46% 0.07% -1.53% c 0.06 
Median -0.66% 0.79% -1.45% b 0.03 
Obs. 976 976 
Panel B: EBITDA/Assets, Propensity Score Match (-2 to +2 Year) 
Star CEO Matched Nonstar CEO Difference P-Value 
Before 
Mean 13.66% 13.85% -0.19% 0.52 
Median 12.83% 13.32% -0.49% 0.15 
Obs. 976 976 
After 
Mean 12.20% 12.49% -0.29% 0.20 
Median 11.57% 12.18% -0.61% 0.13 
Obs. 976 976 
Difference 
Mean -1.46% -1.36% -0.10% 0.64 
Median -0.66% -0.54% -0.12% 0.75 
Obs. 976 976 
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Table 12 Comparison of Investor Responses to News of Hiring CEOs 
The table calculates cumulative market-model abnormal returns for news of hiring CEOs. Cumulative 
market-model abnormal return is computed by using an estimation window of (-250 trading day, -20 
trading day) relative to the announcement date. Two event windows are examined: (0 - 1 trading day) and 
(2 - 20 trading day). Panel A compares the cumulative abnormal returns for news of hiring star versus non-
star CEOs. Panel B compares the cumulative abnormal returns for news of hiring star CEOs by boards with 
long industry tenure versus boards with short industry tenure. Panel B compares the cumulative abnormal 
returns for news of hiring star CEOs by boards with long industry tenure versus with short industry tenure. 
A star CEO is one who was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to 
succession, but also was not overall considered negative by those articles. There are 976 star CEOs and 
2,338 non-star CEOs in our sample. Boards with long industry tenure are those whose independent 
directors on average have at least 9.87 years of industry-related experience. Busy boards are those whose 
independent directors on average hold more than four board seats simultaneously.
Panel A: All CEO Hires 
Star Non-star Diff P-Value 
Event Window 0 ~ 1 day 1.02% a -0.11% 1.14% a 0.00 
0.00 0.31   
Event Window 2 ~ 20 day 0.54% a -0.68% a 1.22% c 0.06 
 0.02 0.00   
Number of Observations 950 2,308   
 Panel B: Star CEO Hires 
Boards With Long 
Industry Tenure 
Boards With Short 
Industry Tenure Diff P-Value 
Event Window 0 ~ 1 day 1.48% a 0.58% 0.89% b 0.04 
0.00 0.24   
Event Window 2 ~ 20 day 1.83% -0.39% 2.22% c 0.06 
 0.16 0.11   
Number of Observations 475 475   
 Panel C: Star CEO Hires 
Non-busy Board Busy Board Diff P-Value 
Event Window 0 ~ 1 day 0.76% c 1.27% b -0.51% 0.46 
0.09 0.02   
Event Window 2 ~ 20 day 1.54% -0.28% 1.81% 0.12 
 0.11 0.16   
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This paper compares the compensation design of a star versus a non-star CEO. 
We find that a star CEO is awarded 1.87 million dollars more in annual total 
compensation, and 2.19 million dollars more in option compensation than a non-
star CEO, after we use multivariate regressions to control for firm size, board 
characteristics, B/M ratio, leverage, EBITDA/Assets, stock return, firm risk, 
whether the CEO is an outsider, and industry and year effects. In addition, star 
CEOs receive higher compensation in firms where directors have short industry 
tenure, where directors hold multiple board seats simultaneously, where board 
size is large, and where board is composed of less independent directors. The 
above results hold true after we use a control-group approach, based on CEO 
matching to alleviate CEO selection issue. We also show that the equity portfolio 
of star CEOs exhibit higher sensitivities to change in stock price than non-star 
CEOs.  
JEL Classification: D8; G3; J3 




This paper studies the implication of a star CEO turnover on the compensation 
design of the new CEO. In particular, we address three research questions: (1) Do 
star CEOs receive higher compensation than their peers, (2) Do board 
characteristics affect the compensation level of star CEOs, (3) Does the equity 
portfolio of star CEOs provide higher incentives than their peers? Empirical 
evidence on these research questions provides insight into the role of CEO star 
status and board characteristics in the practice of executive compensation. 
We examine 3,314 CEO successions in S&P 1500 companies from 
ExecuComp during the time period of 1990 to 2008. We measure the star status of 
CEO hires from more than 18,000 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) news texts. After 
conducting both WSJ news counts (how often a CEO is mentioned) and tone 
analysis of these news articles, we define a star CEO as one who meets two 
criteria: he (she) was cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years 
prior to succession and these articles did not overall present a negative tone 
regarding the executive. Our methodology results in a collection of 976 star CEOs 
and 2,338 non-star CEOs during the sample period. 
We find significant difference in the CEO’s annual total compensation 
between a star and a non-star CEO, especially in the compensation component of 
option grants. A star CEO is awarded 1.87 million dollars more in total 
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compensation, and 2.19 million dollars more in annual option compensation than 
a non-star CEO. We derive the above results after we use a multivariate 
regression to control for firm size, board characteristics, B/M ratio, leverage, 
EBITDA/Assets, stock return, firm risk, whether the CEO is an outsider, and 
industry and year effects. The differences in total compensation and option 
compensation between a star and non-star CEO are both significant at the 5% 
level. 
We then investigate the role of board characteristics in influencing the 
practice of star CEO compensation. We find that the above effects of star CEO 
compensation are significantly stronger in firms where directors have short 
industry tenure, where directors hold multiple board seats from other firms 
simultaneously, where board size is large, and where the board is composed of 
less independent directors. Compared with non-star CEOs, there exists a 1.41 
million dollar higher increase in annual total compensation between star CEOs 
hired by two different types of boards, i.e. boards with more than 9.87 years of 
average industry experience versus boards with less than 9.87 years of average 
industry experience. Furthermore, there is a 1.12 million dollar higher increase in 
annual total compensation between star CEOs hired by boards whose average 
independent director holds less than three board seats, versus star CEOs hired by 
other boards.  For every increase in the number of board of directors, the increase 
in total compensation awarded to a star CEO is 0.14 million dollars higher than 
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awarded to a non-star CEO. For every 10% increase in the board independence 
ratio, the decrease in total compensation awarded to a star CEO is 0.10 million 
higher than awarded to a non-star CEO. 
A natural question then to ask is whether star CEOs are paid more than 
nonstar CEOs because star CEOs are more likely to be selected in firms or from 
executives with certain characteristics. Therefore, it may be these firm and 
personal characteristics, rather than CEO star status, that lead to higher level of 
CEO compensation. To alleviate the above selection issue, we use a control-group 
approach based on CEO matching. We match star CEOs with non-star CEOs by 
firm size, industry, EBITDA/Assets, and whether the new CEO comes from 
outside the firm. 
We find that the effects of CEO star status and board characteristics on annual 
compensation are robust to the use of control-group approach. The difference in 
annual total compensation amounts to 2.32 million dollars between star and 
matched non-star CEOs, after we use both multivariate regressions and CEO 
matching to control for the compensation effects of various firm and personal 
characteristics. 
Finally, we examine the equity incentives of star CEOs. We document that the 
equity portfolio of star CEOs exhibit stronger sensitivities to stock price than non-
star CEOs. After controlling for firm size, stock return, firm risk, 
EBITDA/Assets, Leverage, B/M, Outsider CEO, CEO age, and year and industry 
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effects, the change in equity portfolio for a 1% change in firm stock is 76,667 
dollars more for a star CEO versus a non-star CEO. 
This paper provides new evidence on the relation between board 
characteristics and CEO compensation. There is a rapidly growing literature 
studying the role of board characteristics in CEO compensation. This literature in 
general leads to mixed results. For example, Chhaochharia and Grinsttein (2009) 
find a significant decrease in CEO compensation for firms that did not have a 
majority of independent directors before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In 
addition, Faleye (2007) shows that firms with classified boards provide 
significantly lower compensation incentives for their CEOs. On the other hand, 
Guner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) find little evidence that financial expertise of 
directors affect compensation policy. Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz (2010) find that 
directors who are CEOs from other firms do not affect the appointing firm’s CEO 
compensation. Our paper provides evidence that firms where directors have short 
industry tenure or hold multiple board seats, where board size is large, or where 
the board is composed of less independent directors award star CEOs significantly 
more annual total compensation. 
Our research adds to the literature relating managerial power to corporate 
decisions and outcomes. Malmendier and Tate (2009) find that star CEOs who 
win prestigious business awards subsequently perform worse, and have a higher 
tendency to engage in earnings management. Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira 
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(2005) provide results where powerful CEOs are associated with more variable 
stock returns. Bebchuck, Cremers and Peyer (2007) identify CEOs who captures 
the largest fraction of total compensation by the top five highest paid executives. 
They find that these CEOs are associated with lower firm value and have greater 
tendency to be rewarded for luck after industry-wise shock. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data 
sources and main regression variables. In Section 3, we investigate the 
compensation level of star CEOs, and the role of board characteristics in 
explaining star CEO compensation. Section 4 analyzes the incentives of star 
CEOs’ equity portfolio. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Data and Variable Measurement 
 
This section summarizes the data and explains how we measure star CEO, 
board characteristics and executive compensation variables. Table 13 presents 
definitions and data sources of all the variables used in this paper. 
 
2.1 Data Sources 
 
We study the compensation of newly hired CEOs in S&P 1500 companies 
from 1990 to 2008. We identify a newly hired CEO during the first year of an 
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executive’s tenure as a CEO of a specific firm from the ExecuComp database. 
Our final sample consists of 3,314 newly hired CEOs during the sample period. 
These new CEOs come from 1,940 distinct firms. Nine hundred and sixty (960) of 
the firms have more than one new CEO during the sample period.  
Our data source for executive compensation is the ExecuComp database. The 
ExecuComp database provides information on CEO age, annual flow 
compensation and stock and option holdings. We collect information on board 
characteristics from the BoardEx database. We match ExecuComp and BoardEx 
to link new CEO with the board members who selected him (her). The two 
databases have two different identification systems for firms, so we used two 
common data items (firm name and firm ticker) to ensure that the data from a firm 
in ExecuComp is correctly linked to the same firm in BoardEx. 
We analyze WSJ news articles from Factiva to identify star CEOs. Factiva 
offers full text access to news and articles from about 8,000 business sources 
including national and international newspapers, magazines, news wire services, 
web sites, and industry (trade) sources since early 1980s. Finally, we match the 
information on newly hired CEOs from ExecuComp with firm accounting and 
stock return data from Compustat and CRSP. 
 
2.2 Measurement of Star CEO  
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Compared with non-star CEOs, star CEOs are those who are known and 
favored by the business press. In this paper, we define a star CEO hire as one who 
meets two criteria: he (she) was cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the 
five years prior to succession and these articles did not overall present a negative 
tone regarding the executive.  We use WSJ news articles to represent the opinions 
of business press because WSJ is the largest-circulation newspaper in U.S. with 
around three million readers. It is also one of the most recognized business media 
among investors. We require a star CEO to be cited by at least four WSJ articles 
because 30% of all new CEOs in our sample have at least four article citations 
prior to succession. The main results of this paper hold if we use a 10% or 20% 
cutoff of WSJ article citations to define a star CEO. 
In order to identify the WSJ news articles associated with a new CEO as well 
as deciding the tone of these articles, we employ the content analysis 
methodology by Li (2010). Below we describe our approach in a brief manner. 
First, we count the total number of WSJ news articles associated with each 
executive during the five-year time period (-5 year, +0 day) prior to CEO 
succession. An article is counted as media exposure of an executive if it includes 
the name of the executive and one of his (her) past employers. 
 Next, we perform tone analysis on a subset of the above news articles, 
analyzing only those that mention the executive by name at least three times and 
also mention one of the executive’s past employers. We measure the tone of each 
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article by calculating the negative ratio, i.e. the number of negative words divided 
by the total number of words in the article. We then derive the overall tone for an 
executive by calculating the weighted-average of the negative ratios of all his 
(her) news articles. Executives with larger weighted-average negative ratios are 
then excluded so that the remaining sample includes only executives who are not 
negatively portrayed by WSJ. 
 Finally, we sort the WSJ article hits by each executive for the remaining 
sample. We class an executive as a star CEO if he (her) has at least four WSJ 
article hits. Our final sample of 3,314 new CEOs consists of 976 Star CEOs and 
2,338 non-star CEOs. These new CEOs were mentioned in 18,240 WSJ news 
articles during the five years before they were appointed. Figure 6 illustrates the 
distribution of WSJ new articles of our star CEO sample. According to Figure 6, a 
relatively small number of executives attracted the majority of coverage. In our 
sample of 3,314 CEO turnovers, the majority of the CEOs had been quoted in no 
more than two articles, whereas the top 30% of them were cited by 15 articles on 
average. 
Among the sample of 3,314 CEOs, eight hundred and forty six (846) of them 
were hired from outside the firm while two thousand six hundred and forty eight 
(2648) of them came from inside the firm. This study defines an insider CEO as 
one who had already been working for the firm twelve months before the date of 
succession. On the other hand, an outsider CEO is one who joined the firm less 
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than twelve months before the date of succession. In our sample, star CEOs are 
more likely to come from outside the firm than non-star CEOs. Three hundred and 
ten (310) of the 976 star CEOs are outside CEOs, while five hundred and thirty 
six (536) of the 2,338 non-star CEOs are outsiders.  
 
2.3 Measurement of Board Characteristics 
 
We investigate four measures of board characteristics: board size, board 
independence, busy board and board industry tenure. Board size is defined as the 
total number of board directors, including both independent and executive 
directors. Board independence refers to the number of independent board 
members divided by the total number of directors on the board.  A busy board is 
one whose directors tend to hold many boards seats from different firms 
simultaneously. In this paper, we define busy board as the total number of board 
seats held by an average independent board member at the same time. We include 
the above three variables on board composition because previous literature shows 
that board size, board independence, and busy boards have various implications 
on corporate governance as well as firm value.  
We introduce a new variable on board composition, board industry tenure. 
The new variable measures the average industry-related experience accumulated 
by independent directors. In particular, we extract the employment history for 
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every independent director from the BoardEx dataset, considering employment as 
a regular employee, an executive or a director. We then sum up the total years of 
experience in the same industry for every independent director at the CEO hiring 
firm. We use the two-digit SIC code to classify industry. For conglomerate firms 
and firms with multiple business sectors, we include the two-digit SIC codes of all 
business sectors documented in the Compustat Segment data5. 
Panel A of Table 14 presents the summary statistics of our board 
characteristics variables. On average, an independent director had 11 years of 
industry-related experience and more than three board seats simultaneously right 
before CEO succession. An average board is composed of around nine directors, 
with 74% of them being independent. 
Table 15 examines the Pearson correlation among board characteristic 
variables (board industry (dummy), busy board (dummy), board size, and board 
independence). We define board industry (dummy) as one if the average years of 
industry-related experiences of independent directors are above the sample 
median (9.87 years). Similarly, we define busy board (dummy) as one if the 
average number of total board seats held simultaneously by independent directors 
is above the sample median (three).  
As shown in Table 15, board industry tenure is not significantly correlated 
with most other variables except it has a significant negative correlation of 
 
5 The main results in this paper remain unchanged if we only include the two-digit SIC code of a 
firm’s main business sector. 
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21.64% with board size. Busy board is not significantly correlated with board 
industry tenure, but it has a significant correlation of 13.14% with board size, and 
is weakly significantly correlated with board independence at 4.48%. Board 
independence is not significantly correlated with either board industry tenure or 
board size. In summary, Table 15 shows that large boards tend to have directors 
with more board seats and less industry-related experience. However, overall, the 
moderate correlation among the board characteristics variables indicates our 
board characteristic variables are picking up different facets of board 
composition.  
 
2.4 Measurement of CEO Compensation Level  
 
This paper studies total compensation as well as different components of total 
compensation of a new CEO. We measure total compensation as the sum of 
salary, bonus, long term incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted stock 
grants, the value of option grants, and any other annual pay (data item TCD1 in 
ExecuComp). Total compensation is the most common measure of CEO total pay 
in the literature. We also study the components of CEO total compensation 
separately. We derive cash compensation as the sum of salary and bonus. Stock 
compensation is the value of restricted stock grants to the new CEO (data item 
RSTKGRNT in ExecuComp). Option compensation is the value of option grants 
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based on the Black-Schole Formula (data item 
OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE in ExecuComp). We then derive equity-
based compensation as the sum of stock and option compensation. All 
compensation variables are transformed to 2002 dollars using consumer price 
index (CPI) for urban consumers, and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
percentile. 
Panel B of Table 14 summarizes the compensation level for new CEOs in our 
sample, Total compensation awarded to new CEOs has a mean value of 4.53 
million dollars and median value of 2.16 million dollars, with a standard deviation 
of 6.71 million. A majority of new CEO compensation comes from equity-based 
compensation. Option compensation of a new CEO has a mean value of 2.47 
million, and a median value of 0.72 million. . More than half of the new CEOs 
don’t receive any stock compensation, but on average new CEOs receive 0.74 
million dollars in stock compensation. Finally, the distribution of CEO bonus, 
stock compensation and option compensation is highly right-skewed. The bonus 
of a new CEO ranges from 0 dollars (the lower quartile) to 0.53 million dollars 
(the upper quartile), while stock compensation ranges from zero dollars (the lower 
quartile) to 0.37 million dollars (the upper quartile). The option compensation 




2.5 Measurement of CEO Portfolio Equity Incentives 
 
In order to capture CEO incentives from holding stocks and options, we 
analyze the following variables: shares and value of stock holdings, shares and 
value of option holdings, dollar stock incentives, dollar option incentives, and 
dollar equity incentives. The shares and value of stock holdings measure the 
number of shares and value of stocks owned by the new CEO.  The shares of 
option holdings are the number of unvested and vested option shares owned by 
the CEO. The value of option holdings is the estimated aggregate value of in-the-
money options owned by the CEO, calculated based on the difference between the 
exercise price of the options and the close price of the company's stock. 
Following Core and Guay (1999, 2002), we calculate CEO dollar equity 
incentives to assess the sensitivity of CEO equity portfolio to change in stock 
price. CEO dollar equity incentives are defined as the dollar change in his (her) 
stock and option portfolio for a 1% change in stock price. We compute CEO 
dollar equity incentives from his (her) stock and option holdings separately:  
Dollar stock incentives are obtained by multiplying the number of shares of 
restricted stock by 1% of the stock price; and dollar option incentives are obtained 
by multiplying the option delta by the number of options and 1% of the stock 
price. We then sum up dollar stock and option incentives to derive dollar equity 
incentives. 
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We use the following procedure based on the “One-year Approach” by Core 
and Guay (1999, 2002) to calculate option delta from information in the 
ExcecuComp datasbase.  Delta for options is defined as the partial derivative of 
option value to stock price (e –dT Φ(Z), Z = ln (S/X + T(r – d +0.5σ2 / σ T1/2), 
using the Black-Schole model adjusted for dividends payouts (Black and Scholes 
(1973), and Merton (1973)). Stock price, S, is measured at the first fiscal year-end 
under the new CEO (data item PRCCF in ExecuComp).  Volatility, σ, is the stock 
return volatility calculated over the previous sixty month (data item 
BS_VOLATILITY in ExecuComp).  The risk free rate, r, is the rate on seven year 
treasury notes at the end of the fiscal year (data item Risk_Free_Rate in 
ExecuComp). The dividend yield, d, is the company’s average dividend yield over 
the past three years (data item BS_YIELD in ExecuComp). 
We make the following assumptions about time to maturity (T) and exercise 
price (X) of previously granted options in the essence of Core and Guay (1999, 
2002) because ExecuComp does not offer details on these options. We assume 
unvested options have the time to maturity of one year less than that of new 
grants, while vested options have the time to maturity of four year less than that of 
new grants. We estimate the exercise price as the stock price at fiscal year end 
minus the profit per option. Profit per option is calculated separately for unvested 
and vested options. For unvested options, profit per option is the realizable value 
of unvested option (data item OPT_UNEX_UNEXER_EST_VAL in 
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ExecuComp) divided by the number of unvested options (data item 
OPT_UNEX_UNEXER_NUM in ExecuComp). Profit per option for vested 
options is calculated similarly. We calculate option delta separately for new 
grants, unvested options, and vested options. We then sum up dollar option 
incentives from new grants, unvested options, and vested options to drive the 
dollar option incentives. 
In Table 14 Panel 3, we present summary statistics for CEO portfolio 
incentive variables. An average CEO in our sample holds a stock portfolio worth 
of 10.4 million and an option portfolio with a realizable value of 4.6 million at the 
first fiscal year end of his (her) term. CEO option portfolio on average increases 
0.1 million for every 1% change in firm stock price, while his (her) stock portfolio 
increases 0.13 million for a 1% change in stock price. Taking into consideration 
both stock and option portfolio, the wealth of an average CEO in our sample 
increase 0.25 million dollars when there is a 1% increase in firm stock price. Our 
estimates of CEO dollar equity incentives are consistent with prior findings. 
Jiang, Petroni, and Wang (2010) analyze the annual compensation data on CEOs 
from S&P 1,500 firms during the time period of 1993 to 2006. They document a 
similar mean value of 0.23 million for CEO dollar equity incentives.  
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3 Board Characteristics and Level of Star CEO 
Compensation 
 
In this section, we investigate CEO compensation level at the first fiscal year 
end of their term. We pay special attention to the differences in total 
compensation as well as compensation components between star and non-star 
CEOs. Additionally, we examine the role of board characteristics in explaining 
new CEO compensation. 
 
3.1  Univariate Analysis of Star Versus Non-star CEO 
Compensation 
 
We compare the mean and median differences in CEO compensation variables 
between star and non-star CEOs in Table 16. To avoid the influence of outliers, 
all compensation variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentile based on 
all observations. We implement two-sample t-tests and median tests to examine 
whether the population means and medians are significantly different for different 
types of CEOs. 
Table 16 shows that the median total compensation of a newly hired star CEO 
is 2.48 million dollars more than a newly hired non-star CEO. Specifically, the 
median star CEO receive 0.36 million dollars more in cash compensation and 1.58 
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million dollars more in equity-based compensation. Among all compensation 
components, the dollar difference in option compensation between star and non-
stars are of the largest scale. A median newly hired star CEO is awarded option 
compensation worth of 1.69 million, while a median non-star CEO is awarded 
option compensation worth of 0.53 million. All of the above differences in 
compensation components between star and non-star CEOs are significant at the 
1% level. 
A natural question then to ask is whether the above compensation differences 
are driven by the fact that star CEOs are more likely to be selected from outside 
the firm and outsider CEOs in general are paid higher than insider CEOs (Li 
(2010)). We thus test the above hypothesis by comparing the differences in 
compensation between star and non-stars, conditional on being an outsider or 
insider CEO. In particular, we compare the compensation level between outside 
star CEOs and outside non-star CEOs in Table 17, and between inside star CEOs 
and inside non-star CEOs in Table 18. 
In summary, the results in Table 17 and Table 18 show that star CEOs are 
awarded significantly more cash and equity based compensation than non-star 
CEOs, both within the insider CEO category and within the outsider CEO 
category. A median outside star CEO receive 3.80 million more total 
compensation than a median outside non-star CEO, while a median inside star 
CEO receives 2.18 million more total compensation than a median inside non-star 
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CEO. Overall, outsiders CEOs are awarded less cash compensation and almost 
double stock and option compensation than insider CEOs. Within the group of 
outside or inside CEOs, the differences in cash and equity-based compensation 
between star and non-stars are all significant at the 1% level. A median outside 
star CEO receives 1.62 million more option compensation than a median outside 
non-star CEO, while a median inside star CEO receives 0.82 million more option 
compensation than a median inside non-star CEO. 
 
3.2 Univariate Analysis of Star CEO Compensation by Board 
Characteristics 
 
The previous section reveals that star CEOs are awarded a significantly higher 
level of compensation than non-star CEOs. In this section, we investigate whether 
the high compensation level of star CEOs are concentrated in firms with certain 
board characteristics. In particular, we examine the relation between board 
industry tenure, busy board, board size and board independence and the level of 
star CEO compensation. To achieve this goal, we focus on the sub-sample of 958 
star CEOs and summarize star CEO compensation variables by board 
characteristics. 
The results, presented in Table 19, show a significant difference in CEO 
compensation among star CEOs hired by different types of company boards.  
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Firms whose directors on average have more than 9.8 years of industry experience 
award the star CEO a median total compensation of 4.87 million dollars, while 
other firms award the star CEO a median compensation of 2.71 million dollars. 
The difference in median CEO total compensation is 1.16 million between the 
two board types. Furthermore, the difference in median star CEO total 
compensation is 1.27 million between firms whose average director has more than 
three board seats and other firms.  
Table 19 also shows that difference in equity-based compensation accounts 
for a significant portion of the difference in star CEO compensation between 
different board types.  Firms whose directors on average have more than 9.8 years 
of industry experience award the star CEO 1.04 million dollars more in median 
equity-based compensation. Firms whose directors on average have more than 
three board seats award the star CEO 1.13 million more in median equity-based 
compensation. 
Figure 7 presents the median star CEO compensation from firms with 
different ranges of board industry tenure. It illustrates a monotonic inverse 
relationship between star CEO total compensation and board industry tenure. For 
firms within the lowest quartile group of board industry tenure, i.e. firms whose 
average independent director has 0.4 years to 6.34 years of industry experience, 
the median star CEO total compensation is 4.9 million dollars. For firms within 
the second and third quartile group of board industry tenure, i.e. firms whose 
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average independent director has 6.34 to 9.87 and 9.87 to 14.10 years of industry 
experience, the median star CEO total compensation is 4.6 million and 3.9 million 
dollars respectively.  Finally, for firms whose average independent director has 
more than 14.10 years of industry experience, star CEOs receive 3.4 million 
dollars of median total compensation. 
 
3.3 Multivariate Regressions Of New CEO Compensation 
 
Characteristics other than CEO star status and board composition could 
potentially affect CEO compensation. To assess more directly the statistical and 
economical significance of the role of star status and board characteristics in new 
CEO compensation, we estimate the following multivariate regression model after 
controlling for potential firm, board and CEO characteristics: 
C = α + β Star+ γ Star*BoardChar +λ BoardChar + ϕ X + ε (2) 
The dependent variable C is CEO compensation level variables in millions at 
the first fiscal year end under the new CEO. We examine total compensation, cash 
compensation, stock compensation, option compensation and equity-based 
compensation separately in each regression. Star is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the new CEO is a star CEO. BoardChar is a set of board characteristics 
variables that include board industry tenure, busy board, board size and board 
independence. We include interaction terms between Star and BoardChar to 
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examine whether board characteristics play a more significant role within the sub-
group of star CEOs. Following the previous literature (e.g. Bebchuck and 
Grinstein(2005), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker(1999), Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2009), Fahlenbrach (2008), Faulkender and Yang (2010), Hwang and 
Kim (2009)), X is a set of control variables on firm size, stock return, firm risk, 
EBITDA/Assets, Leverage, B/M, Outsider CEO, CEO age, and year and industry 
effects. 
We present the regression results of CEO total compensation and 
compensation components in Table 20 and Table 21 respectively. The regression 
results in Table 20 confirm our findings from univariate analysis. As shown by 
the coefficient estimate of star CEO in column 3, star CEOs receive 1.87 million 
dollars more in terms of total compensation than non-star CEOs, after controlling 
for firm, board and CEO characteristics. The above coefficient is significant at the 
5% level.  
The signs of the coefficient estimates in Column 1 of Table 20 confirm that 
firms whose boards have short industry tenure, busy directors, large size, or less 
independent directors are associated with higher level of CEO total compensation. 
We then add interaction terms between star CEOs and board characteristics into 
the regression and report the results in Column 3. Interestingly, the effects of 
board industry tenure, busy directors, board size and board independence on CEO 
compensation are concentrated within the sub-ample of star CEOs. Compared 
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with the difference between non-stars hired by busy versus non-busy boards, the 
difference in total compensation between star CEOs hired by busy versus non-
busy boards is 1.12 million dollars higher. More specifically, everything else 
being equal, a non-star CEO hired by a non-busy board receive no additional 
compensation; while a non-star CEO hired by a busy board, a star CEO hired by a 
non-busy board, and a star CEO hired by a busy board receives 0.36, 1.87, and 
3.35 million additional compensation respectively.  
The difference in total compensation between star CEOs hired by boards with 
short versus long industry tenure is 1.41 million higher than the difference 
between non-star CEOs hired by boards with short versus long industry tenure. 
For every additional director sitting on the company boards, the increase in total 
compensation awarded to star CEOs is 0.14 million dollar higher than awarded to 
non-star CEOs. For every 10% increase in the board independence ratio, the 
decrease in total compensation awarded to star CEOs is 0.10 million higher than 
awarded to non-star CEOs. 
The coefficients estimates of control variables show that larger firms award 
more CEO compensation.  Firms with better operating performance, lower 
leverage ratio, or lower book to market ratio award higher level of compensation. 
In addition, CEOs from outside the firm or with lower age are awarded higher 
level of total compensation. The coefficient estimates of the above control 
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variables are all significant at the 1% level except the coefficient estimate of the 
operating performance variable (EBITDA/Assets). 
We also estimate equation (2) using different compensation components as 
independent variables.  Table 21 reveals that the majority of the high 
compensation of star CEOs comes in the format of option grants. After 
controlling for board, firm and CEO characteristics, a star CEO receives 2.19 
million more in terms of option compensation than a non-star CEO. In contrast, 
the difference in cash and stock compensation between star and non-stars are not 
significant at the 10% level. 
 
3.4 Control-Group Analysis Based on CEO Matching  
 
In the previous section, our multivariate regression approach shows that star 
CEOs are paid more than non-star CEOs after controlling for firm, board and 
CEO characteristics. This multivariate regression approach could suffer from 
CEO selection bias if star CEOs are more likely to be selected from firms or 
executives with certain characteristics. In particular, it may be these firm and 
personal characteristics, rather than the star status of new CEOs, that drive the 
excessive pay of star CEOs. 
 In this section, we employ the control-group approach based on CEO 
matching to account for potential selection issue. We match star CEOs with non-
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star CEOs by firm size, industry, operating performance and whether the CEO is 
an outsider. According to Li (2010) and Malmendier and Tate (2009), these firm 
and personal characteristics play a significant role in explaining the selection of 
star CEOs. 
In the essence of Barber and Lyon (1996), we perform our matching method 
as follows. each star CEO is matched to a group of non-star CEOs who satisfy 
four criteria. First, the star and non-star CEO firms have the same first two-digit 
SIC code. Second, the size (Log (sales)) of the non-star CEO firm is within +30% 
of the size of star CEO firm. Third, the previous operating performance 
(EBITDA/ASSETS) of the non-star CEO firms is within +10% of star CEO firm. 
Finally, if the star CEO comes from outside/inside the firm, then the matched 
non-star CEOs must also come from outside/inside the firm. Controlling for 
industry, size, operating performance and outsider CEO, we can isolate the 
components of star CEO excess compensation due to these characteristics. 
We use the matched CEO sample to calculate the mean and median 
differences in CEO compensation between star and matched non-star CEOs in 
Table 22. We then carry out multivariate regression analysis of CEO 
compensation based on the matched CEO sample in Table 23 and Table 24.  As 
shown by the main results in Table 22, Table 23, and Table 24, our previous 
findings on the effects of star CEOs and board characteristics are robust to the use 
of control-group approach.  A median star CEO receives 1.97 million dollars 
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more in total compensation than matched non-star CEOs. The difference in total 
compensation amounts to 2.32 million dollars between star and matched non-star 
CEOs after we use multivariate regressions to control for the compensation 
effects of various firm and personal characteristics. 
 
3.5 Further Tests and Robustness Checks 
 
3.5.1 Regressions of Log Total Compensation 
 
For robustness check, we run regressions of log total compensation, rather 
than total compensation, on board characteristics and star CEO succession to take 
into account the skewed distribution of total compensation. Table 25 displays the 
regression results of log total compensation based on the entire sample of star 
versus non-star CEOs; Table 26 displays the regression results of log total 
compensation based on star versus control-group matched non-star CEOs. 
According to Table 25 and Table 26, the coefficient estimates of log total 
compensation regressions are similar to those of total compensation regressions 
presented in Table 20 and Table 23. In particular, Table 26 shows that the effects 
of star CEO dummy as well as the interaction dummies between star CEO and 
board characteristics are statistically significant at the 5% level, after we use 
control group approach to account for potential selection bias. 
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3.5.2 Regressions of Total Compensation within the Sub-sample of Star 
CEOs 
 
In Table 27, we investigate the role of board characteristics in CEO total 
compensation within the sub-sample of star CEOs. It shows that our previous 
finding on the effects of board characteristics holds true within the subsample of 
star CEOs. According to Table 27, the coefficient estimates of busy board, board 
industry tenure, board size, and board independence are respectively 1329.21, –
1003.47, 108.47, and –908.61. In addition, these coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant at the 5%, 10%, 5%, and 5% level respectively. 
 
4 Equity Incentives of Star CEO Portfolio 
 
We have shown that star CEOs receive a significantly higher level of total 
compensation, especially in the form of equity-based compensation. We now 
proceed to address the following research question: does the equity portfolio of 
star CEOs provide higher equity incentives than non-star CEOs?  
 




In Table 28, we present the results on comparison of the mean and median 
differences in CEO equity incentive variables between star and non-star CEOs. As 
we suspect insider CEOs hold substantially different equity portfolios than outside 
CEOs, we also summarize the difference in equity incentives between star and 
non-star CEOs, within the sub-sample of outsider or insider CEOs. The results 
related to the sub-sample of outsider and insider CEOs are presented respectively 
in Table 29 and Table 30. 
The results in Table 28 to Table 30 shows that star CEOs, on average, hold 
significantly more shares of stocks and options. Their stock and option portfolio 
have higher realizable value, and are more sensitive to changes in firm stock 
price. The above results are significant at 1% level, and hold true both for the 
entire sample and for the sub-sample of inside or outside CEOs. 
Compared with insider CEOs, outsider CEOs hold significantly less shares of 
stocks. On the other hand, there is no significant difference in the number of 
option shares held by outside versus inside CEOs. The realizable value and 
incentives of the option portfolio of outsiders are significantly less than those of 
inside CEOs.  However, despite the differences in equity incentives between 
insider and outside CEOs, star CEOs within either insider or outsider group have 
higher equity incentives than non-star CEOs. The equity portfolio of a median 
outside star CEO increases 0.11 million for a 1% change in stock price, while the 
equity portfolio of a median outside non-star CEO increases 0.44 million.  Within 
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the group of insider CEOs, the equity portfolio of a median star CEO increases 
0.18 million for a 1% change in stock price, while the equity portfolio of a median 
non-star CEO increases 0.73 million dollars. 
 
4.2 Multivariate Regressions Of CEO Equity Incentives 
 
We now examine whether star CEOs are awarded higher equity incentives 
after controlling for relevant factors in multivariate regressions. We use CEO 
dollar equity incentives as the dependent variable, and star CEO dummy as the 
main independent variable. Following pervious literature (Yermack (1995), Core 
and Guay (1999) and etc), we incorporate control variables on firm size, stock 
return, firm risk, EBITDA/Assets, Leverage, B/M, Outsider CEO, CEO age, and 
year and industry effects. 
We run the multivariate regressions for the entire sample and for the sub-
sample of insider and outsider CEOs. The regression results in Table 31 show that 
the dollar equity incentives of star CEOs are significant higher than non-star 
CEOs, both for the entire sample and for the sub-sample of insider and outsider 
CEOs. Over the entire sample, when there is a 1% change in stock price, the 
change in a star CEO’s equity portfolio is 76,667 dollars more than that of a non-
star CEO.  Within the sample of outsider CEOs, the change in a star CEO’s equity 
portfolio is 79,028 dollars more than a non-star CEO. Finally, within the sample 
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of insider CEOs, the change in equity portfolio is 61,702 dollars more for a star 




In this paper, we investigate the compensation level and equity incentives of 
newly hired star CEOs. We have three main findings. First, we find significant 
difference in annual total compensation between a star and a non-star CEO, 
especially in the form of option compensation. Second, the higher compensation 
level of star CEOs are concentrated in firms where directors have short industry 
tenure, where directors hold multiple board seats from other firms simultaneously, 
where board size is large, and where the board is composed of less independent 
directors. The above result is robust to the use of control-group approach based on 
CEO matching, and to controls for firm size, B/M ratio, leverage, 
EBITDA/Assets, stock return, firm risk, whether the CEO is an outsider, and 
industry and year effects. Last, we find that the equity portfolio of star CEOs 
exhibits stronger sensitivities to stock price than non-star CEOs. 
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6 Figures and Tables
Figure 6 Histogram of WSJ Article Hits
The figure shows the histogram of Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article hits related to 3,314 CEO turnovers in our sample. WSJ article hits associated with
each CEO turnover is defined as the number of the WSJ articles that cite the name of both the new CEO and one of his prior employers during the five-year
period before his appointment date. The horizontal axis is the number of WSJ article hits. The vertical axis shows frequency on the left and cumulative




















Figure 7 Board Industry Tenure and Star CEO Compensation
The figure presents the relation between board industry tenure and the total compensation of star CEOs. The data is based on 976 star CEO successions
from S&P1500 companies between 1990 and 2008. A star CEO is one who was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to
succession, but also not overall considered negative by those articles. Total Compensation consists of salary, bonus, long term incentive plan payouts, the
value of restricted stock grants, the value of option grants, and any other annual pay (TCD1 in Execucomp). The horizontal axis is Board Industry Tenure





















Table 13 Variable Definition
Data Item Definition Sources
Age Age of the CEO at the time of succession COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp, AGE
Assets Total Assets COMPUSTAT, Fundamentals Annual, AT
Busy Board Average number of board seats simultaneously held by independentdirectors prior to CEO succession.. BoardEx
Busy Board ( Dummy)
Dummy Variable::it equals one if the average number of total board
seats held simultaneously by independent directors is above the
sample median (3) prior to CEO succession..
BoardEx
Busy Boards
Company boards whose average independent director holds more




Company boards whose average independent director holds less than




Average years of experiences independent directors acquired from





Dummy Varialbe:it equals one if the average years of industry-
related experiences of independent directors are above the sample
median (9.87 years).
BoardEx
Boards with Long Industry
Tenure
Company boards whose average independent director has more than
above the sample median (9.87) years of industry-related experience
prior to CEO succession.
BoardEx
Boards with Short Industry
Tenure
Company boards whose average independent director has less than
above the sample median (9.87) years of industry-related experience
prior to CEO succession..
BoardEx
Board Independence (The number of independent directors) / (The total number ofdirectors) BoardEx
Board Size Total number of directors BoardEx
Bonus The dollar value of a bonus earned by the CEO. COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp, BONUS
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Book to Market Ratio The ratio of book value of equity divided by market value of equity COMPUSTAT and CRSP, SEQ/(PRC *SHROUT)
Cash Compensation The sum of bonus and salary earned by the CEO. COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp, (BONUS + SALARY)
Dollar Option Incentives Dollar change in CEO's option portfolio for a 1% change in stockprice
COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp, refer to Section 2.5 for
estimation procedure




Dollar change in CEO's stock and option portfolio for a 1% change
in stock price. It equals the sum of dollar option incentives and
dollar stock incentives
COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp
EBITDA / Assets (Operating Income Before Depreciation) / (Total Assets) COMPUSTAT, Fundamentals Annual, OIBDP / AT
Equity-based Compensation The sum of the value of restricted stocks and options granted to theCEO.
COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp,
(RSTKGRNT+OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE)
Firm Risk Standard deviation of stock return caculated over 60 months prior toCEO succession. COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp, BS_Volatility
Firm Size or Log Sales Firm size, measured by Log(Sales) COMPUSTAT, Fundamentals Annual, Log(SALE)
Industry Effect A group of dummy variables, each of which represents an industryby two-digit SIC code COMPUSTAT, Fundamentals Annual, SIC
Leverage Ratio Total liabilites divided by total assets COMPUSTAT, Fundamentals Annual, LT/AT
Outside CEO
Dummy variable: it equals 1 if the incoming CEO is an outside
CEO. An incoming CEO is defined as an outside CEO if he joined
the hiring firm less than twelve months before the date of
succession.
COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp




The estimated aggregate value of in-the-money options owned by
the CEO , calculated based on the difference between the exercise




Salary The dollar value of salary earned by the CEO. COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp, SALARY
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Sales Net sales COMPUSTAT, Fundamentals Annual, SALE
Six-month Stock Return Six-month holding period stock return until the date of CEOsuccession CRSP, Monthly Stock
Star CEO
Dummy variable: it equals one if the new CEO was not only cited by
at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to
succession, but also was not overall considered negative by those
articles.
Factiva
Stock Compensation The value of restricted stocks granted to the CEO. COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp, RSTKGRNT
Stock Holdings The value of stocks owned by the CEO. COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp,SHOWN_EXCEL_OPTS*PRCCF
Total Compensation
Total compensation earned by the CEO. It consists of salary, bonus,
long term incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted stock grants,
the value of option grants, and any other annual pay.
COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp, TCD1
Year Effect A group of dummy variables, each of which represents a yearbetween 1990 and 2008
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Table 14 Summary Statistics of Board Characteristics and New CEO Compensation 
 
The table presents summary statistics for the board characteristics and CEO compensation variables in 
this paper. The sample is based on 3,314 CEO successions from S&P1500 companies between 1990 and 
2008. All the descriptive statistics are based on winsorized data. All observations are winsorized at the first 
and 99th percentiles, based on all firm-year observations. CEO compensation variables are calculated based 
on thousands of 2002 dollars using the consumer price index (CPI) for urban consumers. The following 
summary statistics are reported for each variable: number of observations, sample mean, sample standard 
deviation, the first quartile (25 percentile), sample median and the third quartile (75 percentile). Panel A, B 
and C present summary statistics for variables on board characteristics immediately before CEO succession, 
and on CEO compensation level and incentives during the first year of his (her) term. Board Size refers to 
the total number of board directors. Board Industry Tenure is the average years of experiences independent 
directors acquired from firms of the same industry as the CEO turnover company. Busy Board is the 
number of total board seats that an average independent board member holds simultaneously. Board Size 
refers to the total number of board directors. Board Independence is measured by the number of 
independent board members divided by total number of directors.  Total Compensation consists of salary, 
bonus, long term incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted stock grants, the value of option grants, and 
any other annual pay (TCD1 in Execucomp). Cash Compensation is the sum of Bonus and Salary. Stock 
Compensation is the value of the value of stock grants (RSTKGRNT in Execucomp). Option Compensation 
is the value of options calculated based on Black-Schole model (OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE in 
Execucomp). Equity-based Compensation is the sum of Stock Compensation and Option Compensation. 
Stock Holdings measure the value of stock portfolio owned by the CEO 
(SHOWN_EXCEL_OPTS*PRCCF in Execomp). Option holdings are the estimated aggregate value of in-
the-money options owned by the CEO, calculated based on the difference between the exercise price of the 
options and the close price of the company's stock.  (OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL + 
OPT_UNEX_UNEXER_EST_VAL in Execucomp). Dollar Option Incentives and Dollar Stock Incentives 
measure the dollar change in CEO's option and stock portfolio for a 1% change in stock price respectively. 
Dollar Equity Incentives are the sum of Dollar Option Incentives and Dollar Stock Incentives. 
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Panel A: Board Characteristics 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Board Industry Tenure 3,314 11.01 6.65 6.34 9.87 14.10
Busy Board 3,314 3.21 1.31 2.25 3.00 3.86
Board Size 3,314 8.99 4.42 6.00 9.00 12.00
Board Independence 3,314 0.74 0.16 0.67 0.75 0.85
Panel B: New CEO Compensation 
Unit: Thousand Dollars Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Total Compensation 3,258 4,532.15 6,712.93 986.47 2,156.91 4,837.57
Salary 3,258 464.35 265.92 282.37 425.00 617.49
Bonus 3,258 459.81 766.01 0.00 211.26 531.79
Cash Compensation 3,258 929.50 934.96 400.00 664.08 1,094.66
Stock Compensation 3,258 741.49 2,008.11 0.00 0.00 373.50
Option Compensation 3,258 2,473.33 4,973.13 76.82 719.83 2,462.22
Equity-based 
Compensation 3,258 3,238.51 5,921.54 233.41 1,120.21 3,250.52
Panel C: New CEO Compensation Incentives 
Unit: Thousand Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Stock Holding Shares 3,156 412.01 1,376.20 15.00 66.53 211.96
Option Holding Shares 3,156 611.12 990.11 118.98 300.00 655.46
Stock Holdings 3,156 10,393.44 33,871.97 277.31 1,565.05 5,550.85
Option Holdings 3,156 4,644.72 10,304.46 9.47 807.80 4,008.83
Dollar Stock Incentives 3,156 103.93 338.72 2.77 15.65 55.51
Dollar Option 
Incentives 3,156 129.52 228.50 14.66 46.71 133.64
Dollar Equity 
Incentives 3,156 254.28 545.85 29.68 84.59 222.81
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Table 15 Correlations among Board Characteristics Variables 
 
The table presents the correlations among the four board characteristics variables in this paper: board 
industry tenure, busy board, and board size and board independence. The sample is composed of 29,793 
directors who sit on the board during 3,314 CEO successions from S&P1500 companies between 1990 and 
2008. Board Industry Tenure (Dummy) equals one if the average years of industry-related experiences of 
independent directors are above the sample median (9.87 years), and zero otherwise. Busy Board (Dummy) 
equals one if the average number of total board seats held simultaneously by independent directors is above 
the sample median (3), and zero otherwise. Board Size refers to the total number of board directors. Board 
Independence is measured by the number of independent board members divided by total number of 
directors.  P-value for the test that the two variables are independent is reported below the correlation. a, b, 
and c denote significance for the test at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Board Long 
Industry Tenure Busy Board Board Size 
Board 
Independence 
Board Long Industry 
Tenure 1.0000    
0.00    
Busy Board -0.0188 1.0000   
 0.28 0.00   
Board Size -0.2164 a 0.1314 a 1.0000  
 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Board Independence -0.0048 0.0448 a 0.0041 1.0000 
 0.78 0.01 0.82 0.00 
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Table 16 Comparison of CEO Compensation Level between Star and Non-star CEOs 
The table compares the mean and median differences in CEO compensation level at the first fiscal year end 
of their term between star and non-star CEOs. The sample is based on 3,314 CEO successions from 
S&P1500 companies between 1990 and 2008. A star CEO is one who was not only cited by at least four 
WSJ news articles over the five years prior to succession, but also not overall considered negative by those 
articles. There are 976 star CEOs and 2,338 non-star CEOs in our sample. All the descriptive statistics are 
based on winsorized data.  All observations are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles, based on all 
firm-year observations. CEO compensation variables are calculated based on thousands of 2002 dollars 
using the consumer price index (CPI) for urban consumers. Total Compensation consists of salary, bonus, 
long term incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted stock grants, the value of option grants, and any 
other annual pay (TCD1 in Execucomp). Cash Compensation is the sum of Bonus and Salary. Stock 
Compensation is the value of the value of stock grants (RSTKGRNT in Execucomp). Option Compensation 
is the value of options calculated based on Black-Schole model (OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE in 
Execucomp). Equity-based Compensation is the sum of Stock Compensation and Option Compensation. P-
values of two-tailed t tests and median tests for testing differences in population means and medians are 
reported after the difference in mean and median values. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
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Star CEO Nonstar CEO Difference P-Value 
Total Compensation     
Mean 8,073.00 3,057.30 5,015.70 a 0.00 
Median 4,185.08 1,701.41 2,483.67 a 0.00 
Obs. 958 2,300   
Cash Compensation     
Mean 1,344.46 756.66 587.80 a 0.00 
Median 956.41 589.44 366.97 a 0.00 
Obs. 958 2,300   
Stock Compensation     
Mean 1,410.45 462.85 947.59 a 0.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 a 0.00 
Obs. 958 2,300   
Option Compensation     
Mean 4,567.85 1,600.92 2,966.94 a 0.00 
Median 1,691.02 530.69 1,160.34 a 0.00 
Obs. 958 2,300   
Equity-based Compensation     
Mean 6,049.41 2,067.71 3,981.70 a 0.00 
Median 2,420.74 840.13 1,580.61 a 0.00 
Obs. 958 2,300     
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Table 17 Comparison of CEO Compensation Level between Outside 
Star and Non-star CEOs 
 
The table compares the mean and median differences in CEO compensation level at the first fiscal year end 
of their term between outside star and outside non-star CEOs. The sample is based on 833 outside CEO 
successions from S&P1500 companies between 1990 and 2008. A star CEO is one who was not only cited 
by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to succession, but also not overall considered 
negative by those articles. An outsider CEO is one who joined the firm as an employee less than twelve 
months before the date of succession There are 303 outside star CEOs and 530 outside non-star CEOs in 
our sample. All the descriptive statistics are based on winsorized data. All observations are winsorized at 
the first and 99th percentiles, based on all firm-year observations. CEO compensation variables are 
calculated based on thousands of 2002 dollars using the consumer price index (CPI) for urban consumers. 
Total Compensation consists of salary, bonus, long term incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted 
stock grants, the value of option grants, and any other annual pay (TCD1 in Execucomp). Cash 
Compensation is the sum of Bonus and Salary. Stock Compensation is the value of the value of stock grants 
(RSTKGRNT in Execucomp). Option Compensation is the value of options calculated based on Black-
Schole model (OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE in Execucomp). Equity-based Compensation is the 
sum of Stock Compensation and Option Compensation. P-values of two-tailed t tests and median tests for 
testing differences in population means and medians are reported after the difference in mean and median 
values. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
114
Star CEO Nonstar CEO Difference P-Value 
Total Compensation     
Mean 10,592.45 3,999.78 6,592.67 a 0.00 
Median 6,052.17 2,248.91 3,803.27 a 0.00 
Obs. 303 530   
Cash Compensation     
Mean 1,232.67 648.63 584.04 a 0.00 
Median 725.75 490.11 235.64 a 0.00 
Obs. 303 530   
Stock Compensation     
Mean 2,368.03 643.97 1,724.06 a 0.00 
Median 165.00 0.00 165.00 a 0.00 
Obs. 303 530   
Option Compensation     
Mean 6,282.61 2,535.31 3,747.30 a 0.00 
Median 2,718.65 1,096.69 1,621.96 a 0.00 
Obs. 303 530   
Equity-based Compensation     
Mean 8,689.75 3,162.33 5,527.42 a 0.00 
Median 4,297.75 1,536.56 2,761.19 a 0.00 
Obs. 303 530     
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Table 18 Comparison of CEO Compensation Level between Inside Star and Non-star CEOs 
 
The table compares the mean and median differences in CEO compensation level at the first fiscal year end 
of their term between inside star and outside non-star CEOs. The sample is based on 2,452 inside CEO 
successions from S&P1500 companies between 1990 and 2008. A star CEO is one who was not only cited 
by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to succession, but also not overall considered 
negative by those articles. An insider CEO is one who joined the firm as an employee more than twelve 
months before the date of succession There are 655 inside star CEOs and 1,770 inside non-star CEOs in our 
sample. All the descriptive statistics are based on winsorized data. All observations are winsorized at the 
first and 99th percentiles, based on all firm-year observations. CEO compensation variables are calculated 
based on thousands of 2002 dollars using the consumer price index (CPI) for urban consumers. Total 
Compensation consists of salary, bonus, long term incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted stock 
grants, the value of option grants, and any other annual pay (TCD1 in Execucomp). Cash Compensation is 
the sum f Bonus and Salary. Stock Compensation is the value of the value of stock grants (RSTKGRNT in 
Execucomp). Option Compensation is the value of options calculated based on Black-Schole model 
(OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE in Execucomp). Equity-based Compensation is the sum of Stock 
Compensation and Option Compensation. P-values of two-tailed t tests and median tests for testing 
differences in population means and medians are reported after the difference in mean and median values. 
a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Star CEO Nonstar CEO Difference P-Value 
Total Compensation     
Mean 6,907.51 2,775.09 4,132.43 a 0.00 
Median 3,740.82 1,557.57 2,183.24 a 0.00 
Obs. 655 1,770   
Cash Compensation     
Mean 1,396.17 789.01 607.16 a 0.00 
Median 987.40 607.55 379.85 a 0.00 
Obs. 655 1,770   
Stock Compensation     
Mean 967.47 408.62 558.85 a 0.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 a 0.00 
Obs. 655 1,770   
Option Compensation     
Mean 3,774.61 1,321.13 2,453.49 a 0.00 
Median 1,245.70 421.97 823.73 a 0.00 
Obs. 655 1,770   
Equity-based Compensation     
Mean 4,828.00 1,739.95 3,088.06 a 0.00 
Median 1,832.76 668.19 1,164.57 a 0.00 
Obs. 655 1,770     
117
Table 19 Comparison of Star CEO Compensation Level by Board Types 
 
The table compares the mean and median differences in star CEO compensation level at the first fiscal year 
end of their term by board types. The sample is based on 976 star CEO successions from S&P1500 
companies between 1990 and 2008. A star CEO is one who was not only cited by at least four WSJ news 
articles over the five years prior to succession, but also not overall considered negative by those articles.
All the descriptive statistics are based on winsorized data.  All observations are winsorized at the first and 
99th percentiles, based on all firm-year observations. CEO compensation variables are calculated based on 
thousands of 2002 dollars using the consumer price index (CPI) for urban consumers. Total Compensation 
consists of salary, bonus, long term incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted stock grants, the value of 
option grants, and any other annual pay (TCD1 in Execucomp). Cash Compensation is the sum of Bonus 
and Salary. Stock Compensation is the value of the value of stock grants (RSTKGRNT in Execucomp). 
Option Compensation is the value of options calculated based on Black-Schole model 
(OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE in Execucomp). Equity-based Compensation is the sum of Stock 
Compensation and Option Compensation. Boards with Long/Short Industry Tenure refer to boards whose 
average independent director has more/less than 9.87 years of industry-related experience prior to CEO 
succession. Busy/Non-busy Boards refer to boards whose average independent director has more/less than 
three board seats simultaneously prior to CEO succession. P-values of two-tailed t tests and median tests 
for testing differences in population means and medians are reported after the difference in mean and 
median values. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Panel A: Board Industry Tenure 
Boards with Long 
Industry Tenure 
Boards with Short 
Industry Tenure Difference P-Value 
Total Compensation     
Mean 7,031.86 9,149.51 -2,117.65 a 0.00 
Median 3,709.18 4,870.87 -1,161.69 a 0.00 
Obs. 479 479   
Cash Compensation     
Mean 1,310.51 1,379.56 -69.04 0.40 
Median 892.65 995.29 -102.64 0.10 
Obs. 479 479   
Stock Compensation     
Mean 1,020.13 1,814.02 -793.90 a 0.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 a 0.00 
Obs. 479 479   
Option Compensation     
Mean 4,020.02 5,134.29 -1,114.27 b 0.02 
Median 1,392.77 2,010.07 -617.31 a 0.00 
Obs. 479 479   
Equity-based Compensation     
Mean 5,157.75 6,971.36 -1,813.62 a 0.00 
Median 2,020.24 3,059.63 -1,039.39 a 0.00 
Obs. 479 479   
 Panel B: Busy Board 
Busy Boards Non-busy Boards Difference P-Value 
Total Compensation     
Mean 9,186.76 6,310.79 2,875.97 a 0.00 
Median 4,638.81 3,372.98 1,265.83 a 0.00 
Obs. 479 479   
Cash Compensation     
Mean 1,504.92 1,090.57 414.35 a 0.00 
Median 1,025.00 818.39 206.62 a 0.00 
Obs. 479 479   
Stock Compensation     
Mean 1,630.85 1,061.73 569.12 a 0.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 a 0.00 
Obs. 479 479   
Option Compensation     
Mean 5,193.34 3,578.20 1,615.14 a 0.00 
Median 2,046.34 1,146.60 899.74 a 0.00 
Obs. 479 479   
Equity-based Compensation     
Mean 6,898.93 4,705.29 2,193.64 a 0.00 
Median 2,812.12 1,680.21 1,131.91 a 0.00 
Obs. 479 479     
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Table 20 Board Characteristics and CEO Total Compensation 
 
Coefficient estimates for multivariate regression models are estimated using data of 3,314 CEO 
turnovers from ExecuComp dataset between 1990 and 2008. The dependent variable, Total Compensation 
(in millions), is the sum of salary, bonus, long term incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted stock 
grants, the value of option grants, and any other annual pay (TCD1 in Execucomp) at the first fiscal year 
end under a new CEO. Star CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the newly hired CEO was not only 
cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to succession, but also not overall 
considered negative by those articles. There are 976 star CEOs and 2,338 non-star CEOs in our sample. 
Busy Board (Dummy) is a dummy Variable that equals one if the average number of total board seats held 
simultaneously by independent directors is above the sample median (three). Board Industry Tenure 
(Dummy) is a dummy variable that equals one if the average years of industry-related experiences of 
independent directors are above the sample median (9.87 years). Board Size refers to the total number of 
board directors. Board Independence is measured by the number of independent board members divided by 
total number of directors. Firm size (Log sales) is the log of net sales in the fiscal year prior to succession. 
EBITDA/Assets are the ratio of EBITDA/Assets of the fiscal year prior to CEO succession.  Stock Return 
refers to the one-year holding period stock return prior to CEO succession. Firm Risk is the standard 
deviation of stock return over 60 months prior to CEO succession. Leverage Ratio is calculated as total 
liabilities divided by total assets. Book to Market Ratio is the ratio of book value of equity divided by the 
market value of equity. Age refers to the age of the incoming CEO at the time of succession. Outsider CEO 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the incoming CEO joined the firm less than twelve months before the 
date of succession. Year Effect is a group of dummy variables, each of which represents a year between 
1990 and 2008. Industry Effect is a group of dummy variables, each of which represents an industry by 
two-digit SIC code. P-values for two-tailed tests that the coefficient estimates equal zero are listed under 
the coefficient estimates. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Dependent Variable: Total Compensation (In Thousands) 
Model No. 1 2 3
Star CEO 2,314.79 a 1,866.09 b
0.00 0.03 
Star CEO * Busy Board 1,115.62 b
0.02 
Star CEO * Long Industry Tenure -1,406.42 a
0.00 
Star CEO * Board Size 144.05 a
0.01 
Star CEO * Board Independence -1,007.61 c
0.09 
Busy Board 816.98 a 705.22 a 360.14 
0.00 0.00 0.17 
Long Industry Tenure -276.19 -313.68 88.93 
0.21 0.15 0.73 
Board Size 96.64 a 77.59 b 20.82 
0.00 0.02 0.59 
Board Independence -219.01 -458.70 539.85 
0.75 0.50 0.49 
Firm Size (Log Sales) 2,027.70 a 1,720.28 a 1,690.24 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
EBITDA / Assets -2,240.87 b -1,606.88 -1,488.75 
0.03 0.12 0.15 
Leverage Ratio -4,182.18 a -4,061.18 a -3,968.58 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Book to Market Ratio -2,032.62 a -1,959.26 a -1,929.91 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Stock Return -91.53 -9.36 -27.60 
0.67 0.97 0.90 
Firm Risk 6,371.24 a 6,000.04 a 5,859.50 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Outside CEO 2,780.34 a 2,471.98 a 2,456.63 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age -61.57 a -60.25 a -59.51 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Industry Effect X X X
Year Effect X X X
Num of Obs. 2,936 2,936 2,936 
Goodness of Fit (P-Value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-Squared 0.3136 0.3314 0.3375 
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Table 21 Board Characteristics and CEO Compensation Components 
 
Coefficient estimates for multivariate regression models are estimated using data of 3,314 CEO 
turnovers from ExecuComp dataset between 1990 and 2008. Total Compensation (in millions) is the sum 
of salary, bonus, long term incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted stock grants, the value of option 
grants, and any other annual pay (TCD1 in Execucomp) at the first fiscal year end under a new CEO. Cash 
Compensation is the sum of Bonus and Salary. Stock Compensation is the value of the value of stock grants 
(RSTKGRNT in Execucomp). Option Compensation is the value of options calculated based on Black-
Schole model (OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE in Execucomp). Equity-based Compensation is the 
sum of Stock Compensation and Option Compensation. Star CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the newly hired CEO was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to 
succession, but also not overall considered negative by those articles. There are 976 star CEOs and 2,338 
non-star CEOs in our sample. Busy Board (Dummy) is a dummy Variable that equals one if the average 
number of total board seats held simultaneously by independent directors is above the sample median 
(three). Board Industry Tenure (Dummy) is a dummy variable that equals one if the average years of 
industry-related experiences of independent directors are above the sample median (9.87 years). Board Size 
refers to the total number of board directors. Board Independence is measured by the number of 
independent board members divided by total number of directors. Firm size (Log sales) is the log of net 
sales in the fiscal year prior to succession. EBITDA/Assets are the ratio of EBITDA/Assets of the fiscal 
year prior to CEO succession. Stock Return refers to the one-year holding period stock return prior to CEO 
succession. Leverage Ratio is calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. Firm Risk is the standard 
deviation of stock return over 60 months prior to CEO succession. Book to Market Ratio is the ratio of 
book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Age refers to the age of the incoming CEO at 
the time of succession. Outsider CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the incoming CEO joined the 
firm less than twelve months before the date of succession. Year Effect is a group of dummy variables, 
each of which represents a year between 1990 and 2008. Industry Effect is a group of dummy variables, 
each of which represents an industry by two-digit SIC code. P-values for two-tailed tests that the coefficient 
estimates equal zero are listed under the coefficient estimates. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 
10 percent level, respectively. 
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Model No. 1 2 3 4 5
Star CEO 1,866.09 b 92.74 1,815.27 c -270.33 2,193.79 b
0.03 0.58 0.09 0.49 0.02 
Star CEO * Busy Board 1,115.62 b 48.19 891.12 b 107.97 726.01 c
0.02 0.45 0.04 0.47 0.05 
Star CEO * Long 
Industry Tenure -1,406.42 
a -29.12 -1,215.37 a -633.30 a -672.67 c
0.00 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.07 
Star CEO * Board Size 144.05 a 31.36 a 92.44 c 37.59 b 48.68 
0.01 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.24 
Star CEO * Board 
Independence -1,007.61 
c -351.71 c -737.95 782.21 c -1,502.92 
0.09 0.08 0.58 0.09 0.19 
Busy Board 360.14 67.02 c 326.80 62.42 264.65 
0.17 0.06 0.17 0.45 0.20 
Long Industry Tenure 88.93 44.60 16.84 21.44 -7.93 
0.73 0.21 0.94 0.79 0.97 
Board Size 20.82 6.62 12.68 3.41 8.64 
0.59 0.20 0.72 0.78 0.78 
Board Independence 539.85 12.64 543.20 -46.34 602.26 
0.49 0.91 0.44 0.85 0.33 
Firm Size (Log Sales) 1,690.24 a 238.63 a 1,321.66 a 290.27 a 1,023.42 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EBITDA / Assets -1,488.75 -185.37 -927.74 -365.86 -457.28 
0.15 0.19 0.33 0.27 0.58 
Leverage Ratio -3,968.58 a -25.30 -3,879.35 a -133.28 -3,756.50 a
0.00 0.75 0.00 0.46 0.00 
Book to Market Ratio -1,929.91 a -40.73 -1,897.12 a -137.39 c -1,756.26 a
0.00 0.21 0.00 0.07 0.00 
Stock Return -27.60 154.95 a -130.11 101.48 -226.36 
0.90 0.00 0.51 0.14 0.18 
Firm Risk 5,859.50 a 12.65 5,749.13 a 330.96 5,431.67 a
0.00 0.89 0.00 0.12 0.00 
Outside CEO 2,456.63 a -21.26 2,427.37 a 722.24 a 1,712.88 a
0.00 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age -59.51 a -5.93 a -54.78 a -11.96 b -43.92 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Industry Effect X X X X X
Year Effect X X X X X
Num of Obs. 2,936 2,936 2,936 2,936 2,936 
Goodness of Fit (P-
Value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-Squared 0.34 0.37 0.32 0.18 0.27 
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Table 22 Comparison of CEO Compensation Level between Star 
and Matched Non-star CEOs 
 
The table compares the mean and median differences in CEO compensation level at the first fiscal year end 
of their term between star and matched non-star CEOs. The sample is based on 593 star CEO successions 
and matched 1,036 non-star CEO successions from S&P1500 companies between 1990 and 2008. A star 
CEO is one who was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to 
succession, but also not overall considered negative by those articles. Each star CEO is matched to a group 
of non-star CEOs who satisfy four criteria. First, the star and non-star CEO firms have the same first two-
digit SIC code. Second, the size (Log (sales)) of the non-star CEO firm is within +30% of the size of star 
CEO firm. Third, the previous operating performance (EBITDA/ASSETS) of the non-star CEO firms is 
within +10% of star CEO firm. Finally, if the star CEO comes from outside/inside the firm, then the 
matched non-star CEOs must also come from outside/inside the firm. All the descriptive statistics are based 
on winsorized data.  All observations are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles, based on all firm-year 
observations. CEO compensation variables are calculated based on thousands of 2002 dollars using the 
consumer price index (CPI) for urban consumers. Total Compensation consists of salary, bonus, long term 
incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted stock grants, the value of option grants, and any other annual 
pay (TCD1 in Execucomp). Cash Compensation is the sum of Bonus and Salary. Stock Compensation is 
the value of the value of stock grants (RSTKGRNT in Execucomp). Option Compensation is the value of 
options calculated based on Black-Schole model (OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE in Execucomp). 
Equity-based Compensation is the sum of Stock Compensation and Option Compensation. P-values of two-
tailed t tests and median tests for testing differences in population means and medians are reported after the 




Star CEO Nonstar CEO Difference P-Value 
Total Compensation     
Mean 7,071.56 3,263.31 3,808.26 a 0.00 
Median 3,900.41 1,933.31 1,967.10 a 0.00 
Obs. 593 1,036   
Cash Compensation     
Mean 1,292.05 848.85 443.20 a 0.00 
Median 973.12 687.62 285.50 a 0.00 
Obs. 593 1,036   
Stock Compensation     
Mean 1,131.54 537.03 594.51 a 0.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 b 0.01 
Obs. 593 1,036   
Option Compensation     
Mean 3,970.91 1,600.56 2,370.35 a 0.00 
Median 1,502.82 519.13 983.69 a 0.00 
Obs. 593 1,036   
Equity-based Compensation     
Mean 5,165.26 2,147.30 3,017.96 a 0.00 
Median 2,111.59 896.28 1,215.31 a 0.00 
Obs. 593 1,036     
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Table 23 Board Characteristics and CEO Total Compensation Using Matched 
Sample 
 
Coefficient estimates for multivariate regression models are estimated using data of 593 star CEO 
successions and matched 1,036 non-star CEO successions from ExecuComp dataset between 1990 and 
2008. A star CEO is one who was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior 
to succession, but also not overall considered negative by those articles. Each star CEO is matched to a 
group of non-star CEOs who satisfy four criteria. First, the star and non-star CEO firms have the same first 
two-digit SIC code. Second, the size (Log (sales)) of the non-star CEO firm is within +30% of the size of 
star CEO firm. Third, the previous operating performance (EBITDA/ASSETS) of the non-star CEO firms 
is within +10% of star CEO firm. Finally, if the star CEO comes from outside/inside the firm, then the 
matched non-star CEOs must also come from outside/inside the firm. The dependent variable, Total 
Compensation (in millions), is the sum of salary, bonus, long term incentive plan payouts, the value of 
restricted stock grants, the value of option grants, and any other annual pay (TCD1 in Execucomp) at the 
first fiscal year end under a new CEO. Star CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the new CEO is a 
star CEO. There are 976 star CEOs and 2,338 non-star CEOs in our sample. Busy Board (Dummy) is a 
dummy Variable that equals one if the average number of total board seats held simultaneously by 
independent directors is above the sample median (three). Board Industry Tenure (Dummy) is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the average years of industry-related experiences of independent directors are 
above the sample median (9.87 years). Board Size refers to the total number of board directors. Board 
Independence is measured by the number of independent board members divided by total number of 
directors. Firm size (Log sales) is the log of net sales in the fiscal year prior to succession. EBITDA/Assets 
are the ratio of EBITDA/Assets of the fiscal year prior to CEO succession.  Stock Return refers to the one-
year holding period stock return prior to CEO succession. Firm Risk is the standard deviation of stock 
return over 60 months prior to CEO succession. Leverage Ratio is calculated as total liabilities divided by 
total assets. Book to Market Ratio is the ratio of book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. 
Age refers to the age of the incoming CEO at the time of succession. Outsider CEO is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the incoming CEO joined the firm less than twelve months before the date of succession. 
Year Effect is a group of dummy variables, each of which represents a year between 1990 and 2008. 
Industry Effect is a group of dummy variables, each of which represents an industry by two-digit SIC code. 
P-values for two-tailed tests that the coefficient estimates equal zero are listed under the coefficient 
estimates. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Dependent Variable: Total Compensation (In Thousands) 
Model No. 1 2 3
Star CEO 1,931.27 a 2,321.68 b
0.00 0.04 
Star CEO * Busy Board 944.16 b
0.03 
Star CEO * Long Industry Tenure -931.64 b
0.02 
Star CEO * Board Size 62.23 c
0.06 
Star CEO * Board Independence -1,410.07 b
0.04 
Busy Board 989.12 a 838.52 a 507.55 
0.00 0.01 0.18 
Long Industry Tenure 55.48 26.67 364.44 
0.86 0.93 0.34 
Board Size 16.73 -6.14 -32.25 
0.71 0.89 0.53 
Board Independence 212.05 427.23 887.35 
0.83 0.66 0.45 
Firm Size (Log Sales) 2,097.31 a 1,830.41 a 1,803.33 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
EBITDA / Assets -4,902.68 b -3,721.27 -3,968.16 
0.05 0.13 0.11 
Leverage Ratio -5,607.38 a -5,470.54 a -5,431.30 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Book to Market Ratio -2,990.23 a -2,900.04 a -2,933.57 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Stock Return 75.64 137.65 113.08 
0.83 0.70 0.75 
Firm Risk 6,348.49 a 5,915.99 a 5,823.58 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Outside CEO 2,602.46 a 2,347.93 a 2,304.34 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age -62.98 a -59.70 a -58.98 a
0.00 0.01 0.01 
Industry Effect X X X
Year Effect X X X
Num of Obs. 1,473 1,473 1,473 
Goodness of Fit (P-Value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-Squared 0.3336 0.3493 0.3527 
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Table 24 Board Characteristics and CEO Compensation 
Components Using Matched Sample 
Coefficient estimates for multivariate regression models are estimated using data of 593 star CEO 
successions and matched 1,036 non-star CEO successions from ExecuComp dataset between 1990 and 
2008. A star CEO is one who was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior 
to succession, but also not overall considered negative by those articles. Each star CEO is matched to a 
group of non-star CEOs who satisfy four criteria. First, the star and non-star CEO firms have the same first 
two-digit SIC code. Second, the size (Log (sales)) of the non-star CEO firm is within +30% of the size of 
star CEO firm. Third, the previous operating performance (EBITDA/ASSETS) of the non-star CEO firms 
is within +10% of star CEO firm. Finally, if the star CEO comes from outside/inside the firm, then the 
matched non-star CEOs must also come from outside/inside the firm. Total Compensation (in millions) is 
the sum of salary, bonus, long term incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted stock grants, the value of 
option grants, and any other annual pay (TCD1 in Execucomp) at the first fiscal year end under a new 
CEO. Cash Compensation is the sum of Bonus and Salary. Stock Compensation is the value of the value of 
stock grants (RSTKGRNT in Execucomp). Option Compensation is the value of options calculated based 
on Black-Schole model (OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE in Execucomp). Equity-based Compensation 
is the sum of Stock Compensation and Option Compensation. Star CEO is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the newly hired CEO was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior 
to succession, but also not overall considered negative by those articles. There are 976 star CEOs and 2,338 
non-star CEOs in our sample. Busy Board (Dummy) is a dummy Variable that equals one if the average 
number of total board seats held simultaneously by independent directors is above the sample median 
(three). Board Industry Tenure (Dummy) is a dummy variable that equals one if the average years of 
industry-related experiences of independent directors are above the sample median (9.87 years). Board Size 
refers to the total number of board directors. Board Independence is measured by the number of 
independent board members divided by total number of directors. Firm size (Log sales) is the log of net 
sales in the fiscal year prior to succession. EBITDA/Assets are the ratio of EBITDA/Assets of the fiscal 
year prior to CEO succession.  Stock Return refers to the one-year holding period stock return prior to CEO 
succession. Firm Risk is the standard deviation of stock return over 60 months prior to CEO succession. 
Leverage Ratio is calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. Book to Market Ratio is the ratio of 
book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Age refers to the age of the incoming CEO at 
the time of succession. Outsider CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the incoming CEO joined the 
firm less than twelve months before the date of succession. Year Effect is a group of dummy variables, 
each of which represents a year between 1990 and 2008. Industry Effect is a group of dummy variables, 
each of which represents an industry by two-digit SIC code. P-values for two-tailed tests that the coefficient 
estimates equal zero are listed under the coefficient estimates. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 
10 percent level, respectively. 
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Model No. 1 2 3 4 5
Star CEO 2,321.68 b 48.97 2,359.83 94.30 2,336.38 c
0.04 0.81 0.10 0.85 0.06 
Star CEO * Busy Board 944.16 b 15.50 760.91 222.97 470.05 
0.03 0.85 0.18 0.27 0.34 
Star CEO * Long 
Industry Tenure -931.64 
b 38.49 -926.87 c -308.69 -634.37 
0.02 0.62 0.09 0.11 0.18 
Star CEO * Board Size 62.23 c 35.04 a 34.92 20.62 14.90 
0.06 0.00 0.57 0.34 0.78 
Star CEO * Board 
Independence -1,410.07 
b -461.65 c -1,278.01 -0.31 -1,304.59 
0.04 0.06 0.46 1.00 0.39 
Busy Board 507.55 113.59 b 447.40 -21.94 458.92 
0.18 0.02 0.20 0.86 0.13 
Long Industry Tenure 364.44 0.26 319.76 -74.61 383.80 
0.34 1.00 0.36 0.54 0.20 
Board Size -32.25 -1.50 -30.91 -2.34 -30.10 
0.53 0.82 0.51 0.89 0.46 
Board Independence 887.35 -33.58 941.97 -2.74 995.31 
0.45 0.83 0.38 0.99 0.28 
Firm Size (Log Sales) 1,803.33 a 308.65 a 1,345.04 a 277.54 a 1,068.86 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EBITDA / Assets -3,968.16 -140.71 -2,938.54 -580.79 -1,959.44 
0.11 0.66 0.19 0.46 0.32 
Leverage Ratio -5,431.30 a 1.47 -5,278.80 a 126.51 -5,411.08 a
0.00 0.99 0.00 0.66 0.00 
Book to Market Ratio -2,933.57 a -99.85 c -2,696.62 a -229.78 c -2,440.54 a
0.00 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.00 
Stock Return 113.08 215.99 a -42.87 88.73 -93.43 
0.75 0.00 0.89 0.44 0.74 
Firm Risk 5,823.58 a -54.79 5,964.52 a 371.04 5,692.80 a
0.00 0.68 0.00 0.26 0.00 
Outside CEO 2,304.34 a -94.02 c 2,381.98 a 629.15 a 1,719.13 a
0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age -58.98 a -1.60 -60.42 a -9.05 -48.70 a
0.01 0.57 0.00 0.19 0.00 
Industry Effect X X X X X
Year Effect X X X X X
Num of Obs. 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 
Goodness of Fit (P-
Value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-Squared 0.3527 0.44 0.32 0.15 0.32 
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Table 25 Board Characteristics and CEO Log Total Compensation 
 
Coefficient estimates for multivariate regression models are estimated using data of 3,314 CEO 
turnovers from ExecuComp dataset between 1990 and 2008. The dependent variable, Log Total 
Compensation (in millions), is the logarithm of the sum of salary, bonus, long term incentive plan payouts , 
the value of restricted stock grants, the value of option grants, and any other annual pay (TCD1 in 
Execucomp) at the first fiscal year end under a new CEO. Star CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the newly hired CEO was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to 
succession, but also not overall considered negative by those articles. There are 976 star CEOs and 2,338 
non-star CEOs in our sample. Busy Board (Dummy) is a dummy Variable that equals one if the average 
number of total board seats held simultaneously by independent directors is above the sample median 
(three). Board Industry Tenure (Dummy) is a dummy variable that equals one if the average years of 
industry-related experiences of independent directors are above the sample median (9.87 years). Board Size 
refers to the total number of board directors. Board Independence is measured by the number of 
independent board members divided by total number of directors. Firm size (Log sales) is the log of net 
sales in the fiscal year prior to succession. EBITDA/Assets are the ratio of EBITDA/Assets of the fiscal 
year prior to CEO succession. Stock Return refers to the one-year holding period stock return prior to CEO 
succession. Firm Risk is the standard deviation of stock return over 60 months prior to CEO succession.
Leverage Ratio is calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. Book to Market Ratio is the ratio of 
book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Age refers to the age of the incoming CEO at 
the time of succession. Outsider CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the incoming CEO joined the 
firm less than twelve months before the date of succession. Year Effect is a group of dummy variables, 
each of which represents a year between 1990 and 2008. Industry Effect is a group of dummy variables, 
each of which represents an industry by two-digit SIC code. P-values for two-tailed tests that the coefficient 
estimates equal zero are listed under the coefficient estimates. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 
10 percent level, respectively.
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Dependent Variable: Log Total Compensation 
Model No. 1 2 3
Star CEO 0.314 a 0.398 c
0.00 0.05 
Star CEO * Busy Board 0.141 c
0.06 
Star CEO * Long Industry Tenure -0.098 b
0.03 
Star CEO * Board Size 0.024 a
0.01 
Star CEO * Board Independence -0.126 b
0.03 
Busy Board 0.095 b 0.080 b 0.093 b
0.01 0.03 0.04 
Long Industry Tenure -0.034 -0.039 -0.015 
0.36 0.29 0.73 
Board Size 0.025 a 0.022 a 0.024 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Board Independence -0.017 -0.050 0.046 
0.88 0.66 0.72 
Firm Size (Log Sales) 0.406 a 0.364 a 0.364 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
EBITDA / Assets 0.053 0.065 0.060 
0.90 0.71 0.73 
Leverage Ratio -0.540 a -0.524 a -0.526 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Book to Market Ratio -0.414 a -0.404 a -0.405 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Stock Return 0.091 b 0.102 a 0.103 a
0.01 0.00 0.00 
Firm Risk 0.977 a 0.927 a 0.927 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Outside CEO 0.562 a 0.520 a 0.518 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age -0.020 a -0.019 a -0.019 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Industry Effect X X X
Year Effect X X X
Num of Obs. 2,936 2,936 2,936 
Goodness of Fit (P-Value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-Squared 0.4068 0.4358 0.4361 
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Table 26 Board Characteristics and CEO Log Total Compensation Using Matched 
Sample 
 
Coefficient estimates for multivariate regression models are estimated using data of 593 star CEO 
successions and matched 1,036 non-star CEO successions from ExecuComp dataset between 1990 and 
2008. A star CEO is one who was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior 
to succession, but also not overall considered negative by those articles. Each star CEO is matched to a 
group of non-star CEOs who satisfy four criteria. First, the star and non-star CEO firms have the same first 
two-digit SIC code. Second, the size (Log (sales)) of the non-star CEO firm is within +30% of the size of 
star CEO firm. Third, the previous operating performance (EBITDA/ASSETS) of the non-star CEO firms 
is within +10% of star CEO firm. Finally, if the star CEO comes from outside/inside the firm, then the 
matched non-star CEOs must also come from outside/inside the firm. The dependent variable, Log Total 
Compensation (in millions), is the sum of salary, bonus, long term incentive plan payouts, the value of 
restricted stock grants, the value of option grants, and any other annual pay (TCD1 in Execucomp) at the 
first fiscal year end under a new CEO. Star CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the new CEO is a 
star CEO. There are 976 star CEOs and 2,338 non-star CEOs in our sample. Busy Board (Dummy) is a 
dummy Variable that equals one if the average number of total board seats held simultaneously by 
independent directors is above the sample median (three). Board Industry Tenure (Dummy) is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the average years of industry-related experiences of independent directors are 
above the sample median (9.87 years). Board Size refers to the total number of board directors. Board 
Independence is measured by the number of independent board members divided by total number of 
directors. Firm size (Log sales) is the log of net sales in the fiscal year prior to succession. EBITDA/Assets 
are the ratio of EBITDA/Assets of the fiscal year prior to CEO succession.  Stock Return refers to the one-
year holding period stock return prior to CEO succession. Firm Risk is the standard deviation of stock 
return over 60 months prior to CEO succession. Leverage Ratio is calculated as total liabilities divided by 
total assets. Book to Market Ratio is the ratio of book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. 
Age refers to the age of the incoming CEO at the time of succession. Outsider CEO is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the incoming CEO joined the firm less than twelve months before the date of succession. 
Year Effect is a group of dummy variables, each of which represents a year between 1990 and 2008. 
Industry Effect is a group of dummy variables, each of which represents an industry by two-digit SIC code. 
P-values for two-tailed tests that the coefficient estimates equal zero are listed under the coefficient 
estimates. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Dependent Variable: Log Total Compensation 
Model No. 1 2 3
Star CEO 0.379 b
0.03 
Star CEO * Busy Board 0.086 b
0.02 
Star CEO * Long Industry Tenure -0.142 b
0.03 
Star CEO * Board Size 0.021 b
0.04 
Star CEO * Board Independence -0.076 b
0.04 
Busy Board 0.140 a 0.118 b 0.149 b
0.01 0.02 0.01 
Long Industry Tenure -0.007 -0.003 0.014 
0.88 0.95 0.81 
Board Size 0.014 b 0.010 0.012 
0.05 0.14 0.14 
Board Independence -0.077 -0.046 -0.052 
0.61 0.76 0.78 
Firm Size (Log Sales) 0.437 a 0.397 a 0.399 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
EBITDA / Assets -0.521 -0.347 -0.328 
0.18 0.37 0.40 
Leverage Ratio -0.593 a -0.573 a -0.576 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Book to Market Ratio -0.526 a -0.512 a -0.510 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Stock Return 0.117 b 0.126 b 0.128 b
0.04 0.02 0.02 
Firm Risk 1.100 a 1.036 a 1.036 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Outside CEO 0.513 a 0.476 a 0.477 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age -0.018 a -0.017 a -0.017 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Industry Effect X X X
Year Effect X X X
Num of Obs. 1,473 1,473 1,473 
Goodness of Fit (P-Value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-Squared 0.4645 0.4754 0.4758 
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Table 27 Board Characteristics and Star CEO Compensation Components 
 
Coefficient estimates for multivariate regression models are estimated using data of 976 star CEO 
turnovers from ExecuComp dataset between 1990 and 2008. Total Compensation (in millions) is the sum 
of salary, bonus, long term incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted stock grants, the value of option 
grants, and any other annual pay (TCD1 in Execucomp) at the first fiscal year end under a new CEO. Cash 
Compensation is the sum of Bonus and Salary. Stock Compensation is the value of the value of stock grants 
(RSTKGRNT in Execucomp). Option Compensation is the value of options calculated based on Black-
Schole model (OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE in Execucomp). Equity-based Compensation is the 
sum of Stock Compensation and Option Compensation. Star CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the newly hired CEO was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to 
succession, but also not overall considered negative by those articles. There are 976 star CEOs and 2,338 
non-star CEOs in our sample. Busy Board (Dummy) is a dummy Variable that equals one if the average 
number of total board seats held simultaneously by independent directors is above the sample median 
(three). Board Industry Tenure (Dummy) is a dummy variable that equals one if the average years of 
industry-related experiences of independent directors are above the sample median (9.87 years). Board Size 
refers to the total number of board directors. Board Independence is measured by the number of 
independent board members divided by total number of directors. Firm size (Log sales) is the log of net 
sales in the fiscal year prior to succession. EBITDA/Assets are the ratio of EBITDA/Assets of the fiscal 
year prior to CEO succession. Stock Return refers to the one-year holding period stock return prior to CEO 
succession. Leverage Ratio is calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. Firm Risk is the standard 
deviation of stock return over 60 months prior to CEO succession. Book to Market Ratio is the ratio of 
book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Age refers to the age of the incoming CEO at 
the time of succession. Outsider CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the incoming CEO joined the 
firm less than twelve months before the date of succession. Year Effect is a group of dummy variables, 
each of which represents a year between 1990 and 2008. Industry Effect is a group of dummy variables, 
each of which represents an industry by two-digit SIC code. P-values for two-tailed tests that the coefficient 
estimates equal zero are listed under the coefficient estimates. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 
10 percent level, respectively. 
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Model No. 1 2 3 4 5
Busy Board 1,329.32 b 50.01 1,147.14 b 218.89 837.85 c
0.04 0.54 0.05 0.30 0.09 
Long Industry Tenure -1,003.47 c 0.08 -871.36 -657.34 a -302.84 
0.09 1.00 0.11 0.00 0.51 
Board Size 98.47 b 11.57 c 91.74 c 35.25 b 41.63 
0.02 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.28 
Board Independence -908.61 b -393.48 -428.09 -0.44 -390.33 
0.04 0.12 0.31 0.40 0.30 
Firm Size (Log Sales) 2,749.91 a 343.79 a 2,179.15 a 460.30 a 1,708.26 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EBITDA / Assets -936.45 -6.36 -196.25 379.35 -86.22 
0.78 0.99 0.95 0.73 0.97 
Leverage Ratio -9,772.28 a -66.70 -9,534.70 a -353.70 -9,170.16 a
0.00 0.75 0.00 0.51 0.00 
Book to Market Ratio -2,741.61 a 28.73 -2,815.01 a -172.82 -2,630.89 a
0.00 0.73 0.00 0.42 0.00 
Stock Return 429.38 275.19 a 361.11 77.13 414.57 
0.54 0.00 0.57 0.74 0.45 
Firm Risk 12,583.26 a 120.66 12,208.71 a 866.99 11,333.42 a
0.00 0.64 0.00 0.19 0.00 
Outside CEO 3,723.49 a 92.70 3,838.66 a 1,376.64 a 2,436.47 a
0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Incoming CEO Age -39.09 -1.20 -44.55 -12.73 -32.65 
0.36 0.83 0.25 0.37 0.32 
Industry Effect X X X X X
Year Effect X X X X X
Num of Obs. 893 893 893 893 893 
Goodness of Fit (P-Value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-Squared 0.39 0.40 0.36 0.24 0.36 
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Table 28 Comparison of Equity Incentives between Star and Non-star CEOs 
 
The table compares the mean and median differences in equity incentive at the first fiscal year end of 
their term between star and non-star CEOs. The sample is based on 3,314 CEO successions from S&P1500 
companies between 1990 and 2008. A star CEO is one who was not only cited by at least four WSJ news 
articles over the five years prior to succession, but also not overall considered negative by those articles.
There are 976 star CEOs and 2,338 non-star CEOs in our sample. Stock holdings and Stock holding Shares 
measure the value and the number of stocks owned by the CEO respectively. Option holding Shares are the 
number of unvested and vested option shares owned by the CEO. Option Holdings are the estimated 
aggregate value of in-the-money options owned by the CEO, calculated based on the difference between 
the exercise price of the options and the close price of the company's stock. Dollar Stock/Option Incentives 
are the dollar change in CEO stock/Option portfolio for a 1% change in stock price. Dollar Equity 
Incentives are the sum of Dollar Stock Incentives and Dollar Option Incentives. All the descriptive 
statistics are based on winsorized data.  All observations are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles, 
based on all firm-year observations. P-values of two-tailed t tests and median tests for testing differences in 
population means and medians are reported after the difference in mean and median values. a, b, and c 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Star CEO Nonstar CEO Difference P-Value 
Stock Holding Shares  
Mean 545.71 356.66 189.05 a 0.00 
Median 93.17 58.59 34.59 a 0.00 
Obs. 924 2,232   
Option Holding Shares  
Mean 946.86 458.63 488.23 a 0.00 
Median 450.00 250.00 200.00 a 0.00 
Obs. 924 2,232   
Stock Holdings     
Mean 14,947.41 8,508.19 6,439.22 a 0.00 
Median 2,801.24 1,245.61 1,555.63 a 0.00 
Obs. 924 2,232   
Option Holdings  
Mean 6,984.68 3,665.13 3,319.55 a 0.00 
Median 1,539.00 622.36 916.65 a 0.00 
Obs. 924 2,232   
Dollar Stock Incentives     
Mean 149.47 85.08 64.39 a 0.00 
Median 28.01 12.46 15.56 a 0.00 
Obs. 924 2,232   
Dollar Option 
Incentives  
Mean 214.74 93.84 120.91 a 0.00 
Median 90.18 36.48 53.70 a 0.00 
Obs. 924 2,232   
Dollar Equity 
Incentives  
Mean 413.49 188.37 225.11 a 0.00 
Median 147.23 64.88 82.35 a 0.00 
Obs. 924 2,232     
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Table 29 Comparison of Equity Incentives between Outside Star and Non-star 
CEOs 
 
The table compares the mean and median differences in equity incentives at the first fiscal year end of their 
term between outside star and outside non-star CEOs. The sample is based on 833 outside CEO successions 
from S&P1500 companies between 1990 and 2008. A star CEO is one who was not only cited by at least 
four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to succession, but also not overall considered negative by 
those articles. An outsider CEO is one who joined the firm as an employee less than twelve months before 
the date of succession There are 303 outside star CEOs and 530 outside non-star CEOs in our sample. All 
the descriptive statistics are based on winsorized data. All observations are winsorized at the first and 99th 
percentiles, based on all firm-year observations. Stock holdings and Stock holding Shares measure the 
value and the number of stocks owned by the CEO respectively. Option holding Shares are the number of 
unvested and vested option shares owned by the CEO. Option Holdings are the estimated aggregate value 
of in-the-money options owned by the CEO, calculated based on the difference between the exercise price 
of the options and the close price of the company's stock. Dollar Stock/Option Incentives are the dollar 
change in CEO stock/Option portfolio for a 1% change in stock price. Dollar Equity Incentives are the sum 
of Dollar Stock Incentives and Dollar Option Incentives. P-values of two-tailed t tests and median tests for 
testing differences in population means and medians are reported after the difference in mean and median 
values. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Star CEO Nonstar CEO Difference P-Value 
Stock Holding Shares  
Mean 360.36 191.13 169.23 a 0.00 
Median 71.18 30.00 41.18 a 0.00 
Obs. 295 515   
Option Holding Shares  
Mean 960.78 509.45 451.33 a 0.00 
Median 500.00 300.00 200.00 a 0.00 
Obs. 295 515   
Stock Holdings     
Mean 8,485.33 3,166.64 5,318.69 a 0.00 
Median 1,515.44 478.05 1,037.39 a 0.00 
Obs. 295 515   
Option Holdings  
Mean 4,247.34 2,304.84 1,942.50 a 0.00 
Median 467.50 223.00 244.50 a 0.00 
Obs. 295 515   
Dollar Stock Incentives     
Mean 84.85 31.67 53.19 a 0.00 
Median 15.15 4.78 10.37 a 0.00 
Obs. 295 515   
Dollar Option Incentives     
Mean 163.84 73.19 90.65 a 0.00 
Median 73.12 32.60 40.52 a 0.00 
Obs. 295 515   
Dollar Equity Incentives     
Mean 266.45 106.00 160.45 a 0.00 
Median 105.77 44.29 61.48 a 0.00 
Obs. 295 515     
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Table 30 Comparison of Equity Incentives between Inside Star and Non-star CEOs 
 
The table compares the mean and median differences in CEO compensation level at the first fiscal year end 
of their term between inside star and outside non-star CEOs. The sample is based on 2,452 inside CEO 
successions from S&P1500 companies between 1990 and 2008. A star CEO is one who was not only cited 
by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to succession, but also not overall considered 
negative by those articles. An insider CEO is one who joined the firm as an employee more than twelve 
months before the date of succession There are 655 inside star CEOs and 1,770 inside non-star CEOs in our 
sample. All the descriptive statistics are based on winsorized data. All observations are winsorized at the 
first and 99th percentiles, based on all firm-year observations. Stock holdings and Stock holding Shares 
measure the value and the number of stocks owned by the CEO respectively. Option holding Shares are the 
number of unvested and vested option shares owned by the CEO. Option Holdings are the estimated 
aggregate value of in-the-money options owned by the CEO, calculated based on the difference between 
the exercise price of the options and the close price of the company's stock. Dollar Stock/Option Incentives 
are the dollar change in CEO stock/Option portfolio for a 1% change in stock price. Dollar Equity 
Incentives are the sum of Dollar Stock Incentives and Dollar Option Incentives. P-values of two-tailed t 
tests and median tests for testing differences in population means and medians are reported after the 




Star CEO Nonstar CEO Difference P-Value 
Stock Holding Shares  
Mean 632.64 406.31 226.33 a 0.00 
Median 101.82 66.74 35.08 a 0.00 
Obs. 629 1,717   
Option Holding Shares  
Mean 941.31 446.32 494.99 a 0.00 
Median 423.16 245.70 177.46 a 0.00 
Obs. 629 1,717   
Stock Holdings     
Mean 17,978.11 10,110.34 7,867.77 a 0.00 
Median 3,475.83 1,593.54 1,882.30 a 0.00 
Obs. 629 1,717   
Option Holdings  
Mean 8,254.70 4,070.79 4,183.91 a 0.00 
Median 1,932.56 832.65 1,099.91 a 0.00 
Obs. 629 1,717   
Dollar Stock Incentives     
Mean 179.78 101.10 78.68 a 0.00 
Median 34.76 15.94 18.82 a 0.00 
Obs. 629 1,717   
Dollar Option 
Incentives  
Mean 238.36 100.00 138.37 a 0.00 
Median 101.40 37.71 63.68 a 0.00 
Obs. 629 1,717   
Dollar Equity 
Incentives  
Mean 482.45 213.08 269.37 a 0.00 
Median 181.71 73.12 108.59 a 0.00 
Obs. 629 1,717     
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Table 31 Multivariate Regressions of CEO Equity Incentives 
 
Coefficient estimates for multivariate regression models are estimated using data of 3,314 CEO 
turnovers from ExecuComp dataset between 1990 and 2008. Star CEO is a dummy variable that equals one 
if the newly hired CEO was not only cited by at least four WSJ news articles over the five years prior to 
succession, but also not overall considered negative by those articles. There are 976 star CEOs and 2,338 
non-star CEOs in our sample. Busy Board (Dummy) is a dummy Variable that equals one if the average 
number of total board seats held simultaneously by independent directors is above the sample median 
(three). Board Industry Tenure (Dummy) is a dummy variable that equals one if the average years of 
industry-related experiences of independent directors are above the sample median (9.87 years). Board Size 
refers to the total number of board directors. Board Independence is measured by the number of 
independent board members divided by total number of directors. Firm size (Log sales) is the log of net 
sales in the fiscal year prior to succession. EBITDA/Assets are the ratio of EBITDA/Assets of the fiscal 
year prior to CEO succession.  Stock Return refers to the one-year holding period stock return prior to CEO 
succession. Leverage Ratio is calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. Firm Risk is the standard 
deviation of stock return over 60 months prior to CEO succession. Book to Market Ratio is the ratio of 
book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Age refers to the age of the incoming CEO at 
the time of succession. Outsider CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the incoming CEO joined the 
firm less than twelve months before the date of succession. Year Effect is a group of dummy variables, 
each of which represents a year between 1990 and 2008. Industry Effect is a group of dummy variables, 
each of which represents an industry by two-digit SIC code. P-values for two-tailed tests that the coefficient 
estimates equal zero are listed under the coefficient estimates. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 












Model No. 1 2 3
Star CEO 76.67 c 79.03 c 61.70 c
0.07 0.09 0.08 
Star CEO * Busy Board 33.76 -35.24 102.78 c
0.44 0.57 0.07 
Star CEO * Long Industry 
Tenure 43.18 -96.27 
c 76.95 
0.31 0.08 0.17 
Star CEO * Board Size 13.44 a 9.68 14.03 b
0.01 0.19 0.02 
Star CEO * Board Independence -144.37 c -148.35 -136.56 
0.09 0.46 0.43 
Busy Board 7.11 28.19 -8.79 
0.77 0.44 0.77 
Long Industry Tenure -14.77 53.72 -35.55 
0.54 0.14 0.23 
Board Size -1.04 13.00 b -3.61 
0.77 0.04 0.40 
Board Independence -49.85 111.68 -75.86 
0.49 0.35 0.39 
Firm Size (Log Sales) 69.99 a 13.49 85.71 a
0.00 0.31 0.00 
EBITDA / Assets 45.72 -69.72 132.38 
0.64 0.56 0.32 
Leverage Ratio -304.56 a -290.14 a -305.40 a
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Book to Market Ratio -95.29 a -61.68 c -100.01 a
0.00 0.05 0.00 
Stock Return 47.01 b 60.77 b 44.16 c
0.02 0.03 0.08 
Firm Risk 108.09 c 191.64 b 57.78 
0.09 0.03 0.47 
Outside CEO -92.51 a
0.00 
Industry Effect X X X
Year Effect X X X
Num of Obs. 2,833 723 2,110.00 
Goodness of Fit (P-Value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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